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# Near East/North Africa Report

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## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### COLLAPSE OF ARAB SOLIDARITY FEARED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 29 Nov 80 pp 18-20

[Article: "The Amman Summit: The End of the Solidarity Myth"]

[Text] The Amman Summit meeting which 15 Arab states attended was not attended by 5 states, in addition to the Palestine Liberation Organization, the mainstay of all summit conferences, without which the Arabs would not have had to convene 11 summit meetings in 20 years. This summit was a violent blow that upset the myth of Arab solidarity, Arab fraternity and the Arab dreams that are one and the same, etc. For this reason in particular some people described it as the summit at which "the myth of Arab solidarity collapsed." We chose this description as the title for these pages, and we make some observations on this summit meeting away from the noise and the clamor.

First, it must be acknowledged that an Arab summit meeting at which the PLO is neither represented nor in the heart of the meeting's delegates and supporters is of no use.

Second, the absence of Syria, the heart of Arabism and the center of Arab steadfastness is as significant and as dangerous as the absence of Palestine.

Third, despite all this, the absence of the Palestine Liberation Organization which was to chair this session created considerable turmoil and raised unfortunate questions. Amidst this turmoil, for example, [it was stated] that by staying away from the summit the PLO appeared to be challenging some Arab wishes, that is, the wishes of the 15 countries that attended the meeting. Consequently, the PLO, which was not the subject of the Arab disputes that led to this attenuated summit, lost the sympathy and the funds it needed of a number of Arab countries.

Fourth, no resolution adopted by this summit can be implemented in the absence of Syria, Palestine and Lebanon. In practical terms, they constitute three-fourths of the actual steadfastness front against Israel.

But why did those who refrained from coming stay away, and why did those who attended come?



Those who stayed away--or rather the Syrians and the Palestinians who were the most important absentees--are saying that the proposed Arab summit in Amman cannot be convened in the shadow of the sharp disputes that are taking place in the Arab countries. The Syrians add that Amman itself is no longer in the circle of Arab countries opposing Camp David. Consequently, Jordan is not an appropriate place for convening this summit which was primarily supposed to oppose the Camp David [accords].

The Palestinians are saying that they are more concerned than others not only with the summit meeting, but also with any other Arab gathering. They are also saying that they did not attend the summit, not because someone forced them to stay away, but rather because the conference caught them by surprise at a time when Abu 'Ammar was traveling by air from one capital to another in an attempt to patch up the Arab rift and achieve an all-inclusive attendance even if that required postponing the meeting a few days or a few weeks. However, since the summit did not consider the organization's opinion, the organization found itself in the same boat with Syria and with the remaining parties to the Steadfastness Front.

Those who attended the meeting--speaking the same language as Jordan, the host country, and Saudi Arabia, which represents a moderate course--said, "Postponing the summit would constitute a dangerous precedent that may later turn into cancellation." As long as the objective [of the meeting] is to bring the Arabs together, it would have been more appropriate for those who stayed away to attend; compromise and accord would have been achieved while they were present. The Jordanians are saying, "No one asked us officially to postpone the summit meeting. Being the host country, Jordan cannot take the first step in this matter. It would have been more appropriate for those who requested a postponement when it was too late to request it before it was too late." Regarding the Jordanian-Syrian dispute which has become extremely serious, the Jordanians are saying, "The accusations that Syria is making against us are not true. Consequently, they do not deserve all this clamor. Let us assume that Syria was reproaching us for some positions, why did it not come to the meeting and formulate a resolution condemning us or reconciling with us?" The Saudis are saying, "Our objective is unity and the interests of the nation. As long as the interests of the nation constitute the objective, it would have been more appropriate for the Arabs to attend the summit meeting, to discuss their disputes and to settle them amicably." The Syrians respond to the Saudis by saying, "There is no dispute between us and Saudi Arabia; the dispute is between us and Jordan. It would have been more appropriate for the Saudis to dissuade the Jordanians from their new drift towards Camp David." The Saudis respond to that statement by saying, "What we are interested in is an Arab meeting. At a responsible Arab meeting all matters can be looked into, and agreements can be reached on all matters. Making accusations and counter accusations does not serve the cause or the Arabs."

At any rate, this was the atmosphere of the summit as it was conveyed to us by AL-MUSTAQBAL's delegation in Amman.

Last Tuesday, during a session that included a number of journalists and Arab officials who had been following the news of the 11th Arab Summit Conference, the discussion turned to the fact that Syria, Libya, Algeria, South Yemen, Lebanon and the Palestine Liberation Organization had boycotted the Amman summit meetings. One of those who were present raised the following question: "It is known that Arab summit meetings have always sought to investigate the Arab struggle against the Israeli enemy as well as the latest developments of the Palestinian question. How can the leaders and commanders of 15 Arab states in Amman look into the Palestinian question and the strategy of joint Arab action against the Zionist enemy while the representatives of the Palestinian people, those who have been entrusted with the question are absent from these meetings?"

The fact is that this question, which was brought up in connection with the Amman summit by all those who were following the matter, does reflect in practice the feelings of grief and sorrow that prevailed during the conference meetings because of the absence of the five Arab countries and the PLO. This summit meeting began its business last Tuesday in the Jordanian capital despite suggestions for postponing the meetings made by Syria, Algeria and the PLO during the preparatory meetings of the Arab ministers of foreign affairs.

Feelings of regret were in fact intensified by the PLO's absence from a summit which was trying at this critical stage in the area to formulate a comprehensive strategy that would set up a program for joint Arab action against Israel. The circumstances of this stage stemmed from international and regional complications that were making the situation more critical and, consequently, requiring a maximum of Arab cohesiveness in addition to the formulation of an Arab strategy for joint economic action.

It has been said that Jordanian officials in Amman and officials of the Arab League as well expected Syria, Libya and South Yemen to boycott the Amman summit, but they did not think it likely at all that Algeria and especially the PLO would. This is because Jordanian and Arab League officials were aware of the Arab political actions that were being carried out by the chairman of the organization's Executive Committee, Mr Yasir 'Arafat, during the days that preceded the summit. [Mr 'Arafat was engaged] in an attempt to coordinate Arab positions into a unified Arab position at this summit meeting.

The effect of the summit meeting boycott by the five Arab countries and the PLO was evident in the statement which the secretary general of the Arab League, Mr al-Shadhli al-Qalibi made during the opening session. He said, "The secretariat general of the Arab League, which believes that one of its primary responsibilities is to strengthen Arab solidarity, is disturbed about the fact that the collective course is stumbling because of bilateral disputes. The absence of most of the confrontation countries and of the other countries as well must become a new incentive urging us to consider Arab solidarity the primary matter of concern in the meetings of our conference. We are to come up with practical measures

and resolutions that would enable us to confront this situation, strengthen the resolutions of the conference and guarantee their implementation in a collective fashion."

While the secretary general of the Arab League dealt in his statement with the subject of "the absence of some Arab countries from the summit," it was noted that the statement delivered at the opening session by the Jordanian monarch, King Husayn, chairman of the present conference, did not deal at all with this subject. King Husayn rather spoke about the disputes between Arab governments that were becoming deeper and graver usually because "the governments neglected to deal with them and to solve them when they developed." King Husayn said, "These Arab disputes constitute one of the permanent internal dangers and challenges that the Arab world is facing." As far as other internal dangers are concerned, according to the Jordanian monarch, they are: "increased concern with regional interests at the expense of pan-Arab interests in some areas. There is a disparity in economic standards and in the development stages of the various Arab countries. This situation creates an imbalance in the Arab body as a whole and revives the style of Arab oneupmanship and vituperation, [encouraging] a return to those slogans that prevailed on the Arab scene two decades ago. Those slogans fragmented the Arab world and exacerbated its disunity."

The Jordanian monarch also discussed in his statement the dangers and the challenges that the Arab world was facing on the foreign scene. He identified three dangers. They are:

1. "Direct, imminent dangers that have assumed the form of aggression against Arab land and the gradual division of that land, as is the case with expansionist Zionism.
2. "Attempts from abroad to control the Arab nation and undermine the independence of the Arab people and their sovereignty over their land under various slogans that are not unfamiliar to us.
3. "The cultural challenge that is imposed on us and on others by the movement of history and development, by the fact that the human race is connected and by its high degree of interdependence which implies requirements and pre-cautionary measures that must be taken into consideration."

Although an atmosphere of sorrow and regret overshadowed the Amman summit because of the boycott by some Arab countries, the Amman conference did, nevertheless, hold two closed business meetings and an opening session during its first two days. There were predictions about the possibility of major surprises occurring with regard to changes in the positions of countries that had boycotted the conference. These predictions prevailed in Arab and press circles in Amman. Hence, there were many predictions and many news reports about the possibility that the Arab leaders who were meeting in Amman may form a committee that would go to Damascus to meet with Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad and Mr Yasir 'Arafat to persuade



them to change their position of boycotting the conference. These predictions were reinforced by a number of significant pieces of evidence which political observers in the Jordanian capital had to ponder. Among these pieces of evidence are [the following]:

First, bilateral and collective meetings on the side between the Arab leaders who were staying at the Amman Sheraton were quite frequent. One of the most important of these meetings was the closed trilateral meeting that was held last Tuesday after the opening session of the summit meeting was adjourned. This meeting included Iraq's president, Saddam Husayn, the Jordanian monarch, King Husayn and the Saudi Crown Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz. There was also a group visit which Arab leaders and commanders made to President Saddam Husayn after the first business session of the conference was adjourned last Tuesday evening. This visit delayed the dinner banquet that King Husayn was supposed to host in honor of the Arab leaders.

Second, the first 2 days of the Amman Summit Conference were devoted exclusively to an investigation of economic matters. During the first business session which was held last Tuesday on the evening of the first day of the conference, an agreement was reached over the National Economic Action Pact, the strategy for joint economic action and the consolidated agreement for the investment of Arab funds in Arab countries.

Political observers noted with extreme interest that during a discussion of these matters by Arab leaders, King Husayn made reference to the fact that Arab ministers of foreign affairs, including the ministers of those countries that had chosen to boycott the conference, had joined in preparing these documents and in approving the recommendations made therein. This has special significance because the approval of these documents signifies that they have been approved by all the Arab countries.

Third, the time for the second business session was postponed to the evening of the second day of the conference (last Wednesday) to give Arab leaders an opportunity to make contacts and to make arrangements for lateral and bilateral meetings. This is what Jordan's minister of information and conference spokesman, 'Adnan Abu 'Awdah, said.

But by noon last Wednesday there had been no new developments. The official spokesman [for the conference] told AL-MUSTAQBAL Tuesday evening after the first business session adjourned, "There are no new surprises in the conference so far with regard to the attendance of the boycotting countries."

However, everybody in the Jordanian capital expected "something" to happen to change the situation. There were strong predictions in Amman on the evening of the same day and on Wednesday morning about the possibility that the conference would suspend its meetings for 2 or 3 days so that small committees of Arab leaders can be sent to Damascus to provide

an opportunity for further communications that may persuade the boycotting countries to change their position. There were other predictions about another possibility that the meetings would conclude with a resolution to form an arbitration committee of some Arab leaders who would carry out a collective Arab effort to bring about a reconciliation between the Arab countries. Those who support these predictions referred to what King Husayn had said in the statement he made at the opening session: "Existing disagreements among members of the same family must be treated and settled on the basis of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each Arab country. This is the principle that we have always followed and that we do and will follow honestly and honorably. Our faith in the unity of our nation's destiny is what inspires us with the confidence that [our] brothers will comply with this pan-Arab demand which, in case of compliance, will make a more comprehensive and a more extensive Arab coordination readily accessible. At this meeting we may come to an agreement about the principle of expediting our confrontation of a problem between any two Arab governments as soon as it develops and making the parties to the dispute feel that their dispute, regardless of its magnitude and its nature, goes beyond the limits of their interests [and affects] the rest of the Arab nation. In the final analysis such a dispute will affect Arab solidarity and the course of joint Arab action."

Will this "something" happen?

"Everything is possible and is to be expected." This is what one of the Arab political observers said in the Jordanian capital. An informed Arab source said that most Arab commanders and leaders meeting in Amman believe that it is necessary to do everything and to make every possible effort to avoid having the Arabs split into two camps after they were able to achieve a unified position during the Baghdad and Tunisia summit meetings.

It has been learned that Saudi Crown Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz and the prince of Kuwait, Prince Jabir Ahmad al-Sabbah had made strenuous efforts to avoid cutting the lines [of communication] with the Arab countries that had boycotted [the conference]. An informed Saudi source stated that even if the conference were to end with the five Arab countries and the PLO still boycotting the conference, the financial support resolutions that had been approved at the Baghdad and Tunisia summit conferences will continue. No country will be excluded from Arab financial support even if it had boycotted the conference.

Ultimately, despite the clouds of fog and sorrow that envelop the subject of Arab solidarity, a ray of hope can still dispel all these clouds, especially since the atmosphere seems full of surprises.

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THREATS TO INDEPENDENCE OF GULF COUNTRIES ANALYZED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 29 Nov 80 pp 30-31

[Article by Riyadh Najib al-Rayyis: "The Critical Period: After 10 Years the Independence of the Gulf Is To Be Wrested and Not To Be Given"]

[Text] Despite the fact that the smoke of the Iraqi-Iranian war is still covering the skies of the Gulf, it has not yet obscured from view the fact that 10 full years have gone by since the Gulf countries got their independence. Most of this began between the summer and the fall of 1970. Qatar proclaimed its independence on 3 September; the United Arab Emirates proclaimed its independence on 2 December; Bahrain, on 16 December; and the Sultanate of Oman marks its independence on the day Sultan Qabus ascended the throne on 23 July 1970. It celebrates its independence officially as a national holiday on 18 November of every year.

Ten full years have gone by since the independence of these countries. Their independence is still young, and the countries are still youthful. Most of the countries, however, are still groping for their unity, for the bases of their entity, the meanings of their independence and the symbols of their nationalism. All of these countries are rich in oil and haunted by history; they are pawns of the political destinies that are storming over the Gulf area today. Few of them have placed a strong foothold on the ground, opened their minds to development and established a firm policy for all seasons. One of those few countries is the Sultanate of Oman whose course throughout the seventies may be a model of vital development. An observer may be able to stand at the end of the road that Oman pursued in the seventies in an attempt to discover and to investigate [the achievements of its independence].

Ten years ago Oman consisted of walls of mud; [it was a country] living in the early years of the Middle Ages. Ten years later Oman has become a citadel of modernity and development, vying for the uplands of the last quarter of the 20th century and occupying a position of prominence in the events of the Arabian Peninsula.

A discussion about the independence of the Gulf states must begin with

Oman and with Omani policy during the last 10 years. Oman had mapped out for itself a road that was independent of the other states of the area and a special course that was consistent with its ancient heritage and its unique history.

Let us forget about roads, schools, hospitals, harbors, airports, electricity and water. These would be subjects for another discussion. The political discussion must begin with the reminder that Oman was the only Gulf state that was subjected during the years of its independence to a real war across its borders with South Yemen [which] tried to overthrow the regime in Oman and to force a Marxist ideology upon the country. The war was first supported by Maoist China, then by the Soviet Union and its Cuban and East German allies. This war left clear marks on the Omani way of thinking; it affected the course of Omani politics, upset the course of Omani relations with other countries and imposed on Omani diplomacy a method that differed from the diplomatic methods of its counterparts in the Gulf.

Therefore, Gulf security continued to be a matter of concern for Oman throughout the seventies. The Conference of Gulf Ministers of Foreign Affairs--and that included Iraq and Iran--which was held in Muscat in 1976 was the only serious attempt that took place to advocate the coordination of Gulf security. It is true that the conference has yielded nothing and has not yet been repeated, but it did prove one fact: the countries of the Gulf share the same destiny even if they have different views about numerous political details. Although the Muscat Conference yielded no specific proclamation, it did verify the accuracy of those places which Oman had then identified as places where danger lurked, notwithstanding the fact that this verification was not made till 4 years later.

Because Oman feels threatened--and it still has burning and bitter memories about the reality and the form of this threat--it has no choice but to ally itself with the western camp with which all the countries of the Gulf are affiliated. But it does so without apology and without fear. It too has no choice but "to ask for aid from those who will provide us with the means that would enable us to defend ourselves," says Sultan Qabus, "without becoming embroiled in the struggles of the superpowers or serving the interests of others."

Oman responds to the possibility of U.S. military interference in the gulf by saying that it finds the military and the other activities of the superpowers unacceptable. Oman is against all forms of foreign intervention. However, what the area is experiencing [now] is nothing more than one of the stages of the cold war between the two superpowers. The U.S. military mobilization that Oman is witnessing in the Indian Ocean and in the Arabian Sea is only the result of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and what that intervention may bring in possible expansions in the Arabian Peninsula. It is self-evident that the United States would counter the Soviet attempts of expansion by mobilizing its military forces to protect its interests and the interests of the West in the area.



Therefore, Oman is hoping that the Iraqi-Iranian war will result in a speedy, peaceful solution. Iraq is a "fraternal" country, and Iran is a "friendly" country, and this war is being fought in an area that is full of oil and can ignite quickly. The danger of closing the Strait of Hormuz is still improbable especially since both the Iraqi and the Iranian parties did make a commitment not to interrupt shipping in the strait. Both have kept their promise. This is a responsible position for which Oman appreciates and respects both countries. Since the Strait of Hormuz and its international waterways are located in Oman's territorial waters, Oman considers defending the strait to be like defending Muscat and Salalah. Whatever infringes upon the sovereignty of the strait is an infringement upon Omani sovereignty over all its territory. Therefore, Oman is supporting all efforts that are being made to establish a cease-fire, and it is encouraging all the warring parties to sit at the negotiating table and to settle the disputes by peaceful means. Oman is hoping that this war will bring an end to the spirit of suspicion and lack of confidence that exists between the Arab states of the Gulf and Iran; Oman is hoping this will be the beginning of a new age of fruitful cooperation between them.

But if Iran is inclined to expand the terrain of the war, following the attempts to bombard al-'Abdali in Kuwait, Oman's position then must be consistent with that of all the Arab countries. As a member of the Arab League and in the context of its activities with the Arab group, Oman must abide by any resolution adopted by the Arab League if Iran decides to expand the terrain of war and launch an all-out war against the Arab states of the Gulf. This would be considered a disaster if the Iranians thought about doing this. To counter this danger, Oman thinks that priority must be given to the elimination of bilateral problems between the Gulf states so that these problems would not become a means for the creation of regional disputes that would destabilize the Arab states of the Gulf and disrupt their peace.

For all these reasons the enthusiasm in Oman for the Arab Summit Conference in Amman was considerable. The sultanate thinks that joint Arab action was set forth basically for the principal Arab cause which is the question of Palestine. In the last 10 years this question has undergone many changes and experienced numerous policies. Therefore, there must be a new study of the conduct of joint Arab action at the beginning of the new decade. Despite extreme difficulties that are facing the attempts to bring Arab disputes to an end, a basic foundation for joint Arab action must be established so that the new Arab summit would emerge with a new formula for Arab action in the various fields. The rule of minimum joint Arab action is an acceptable rule if it leads to positive results for the Palestinian question, beginning with self-determination, including the Israeli occupation of Arab lands and ending with the situation of Jerusalem.

Bringing an end to bilateral or group Arab conflicts is not required as much as bringing an end to these conflicts with regard to the Palestinian question and using Arab brainpower to counter Arab outcries

are required. Therefore, Oman thinks it is necessary, since the Palestinian question has rallied support in the world in recent years, that the Palestinian question be brought out of the inter-Arab struggle and that it be supported by a new Arab plan [that utilizes] a new method which recognizes the changes that occurred to the question during recent years and takes advantage of the impetus which the Palestinian question is enjoying at international gatherings.

Oman, like the other states of the Gulf, does not approve of the use of oil as a weapon in political action, especially since it is its opinion that there are still numerous means which the Arab countries can use to exert pressure on European and western parties. To stop pumping oil will not only affect the countries of western Europe and Japan, since these countries have stockpiles of oil, but it will also affect the Third World countries which have no oil reserves and no oil stockpiles. Oman is hoping that the Arab efforts that are being made with the countries of the European Common Market will continue so that the coming months will see a new thrust in the policy of western countries towards support for the Palestinian question, public recognition of the PLO and new efforts being made to achieve a peaceful solution to this question. Arab political means and methods have not all been exhausted or used up yet.

It seems that Oman is in no hurry to solve its disputes with South Yemen, especially since the Gulf initiative, which was followed by the Kuwaiti initiative, came to a close. Oman thinks that the efforts that are being made by the Gulf states to persuade South Yemen to abandon its extremist policy and its total alliance with the Soviet Union has not and will not yield anything.

Anxiety about the strait remains. In Oman one senses that the waters of the Strait of Hormuz flow under all doors. Therefore, the Omani plan to protect the Strait of Hormuz returns to a position of prominence following the events of the Iraqi-Iranian war. The Omani plan proposed that the oil exporting countries and the oil consuming countries provide some kind of guarantee that the strait would remain open if the [waterway] is threatened. These countries would contribute financially to an action plan to provide the heavy equipment that would be necessary for the continued use of these waterways if they become the target of sabotage or a shut-down. Reactions from some of the Arab countries were negative at the time. However, recent events have revealed the short-sightedness of the whole world, including the United States, with regard to the Gulf.

Ten years in the childhood of independence have gone by for the Gulf states, and 10 years of youth are awaiting these states as they prepare to enter the eighties. What is important is that this child does not age while he is still crawling. It is important that he not find himself in the autumn of life still trying to find his way politically on an arduous and long road. It is important that he be released from the yoke of guardianship and realize after the experience of the past decade how true is the statement of King Faysal the First of Iraq: "Independence is to be wrested and not to be given."

If independence were given as an easy gift to some of the Gulf states,  
Oman took its independence with considerable effort, toil and will power.

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CSO: 4802

## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### BRIEFS

TUNISIAN-MOROCCAN TELEGRAPH LINE--Tunis, Dec. 19 (MAP)--A second direct telegraphic line linking, in duplex, the Tunisian News Agency "TAP" and the Moroccan News Agency "MAP" was put into service Thursday morning. This new line, added to the one already established a few years ago, will allow both agencies to exchange the whole of their respective national and international news services in Arabic. This further reinforcement of bilateral cooperation comes on the eve of the official visit Moroccan Premier and Minister of Justice Maati Bouabid is to undertake to Tunisia, and is part of cooperation in the Maghreb. [Text] [LD221354 Rabat MAP in English 1224 GMT 19 Dec 80]

CSO: 4420



## FEDA'YAN-E KHALQ ACCUSED OF PRO-SOVIETISM, TREASON

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 12 Nov 80 pp 12, 9

[Text] Feda'yan-e Khalq Organization "Majority," which is the same as the Feda'yan-e Khalq Organization with a changed name, is well known to us all. The leader of the organization, which from the beginning of the victory of our revolution, had dreamt of coming to power, resorted to every trick after they became disappointed. In the days before the revolution, they first kept silent about the role of the Imam and the Islamic character of the revolution (Organization's communiques issued from early Dey to 10 Bahman 1357 [22 Dec 78-30 Jan 79] and news bulletins, issues 1 to 4). After the victory of the revolution, they tacitly referred to the sovereignty of the Islamic Republic and the leadership of the Imam (Organization's communique dated 25/11/57 [14 Feb 79] entitled "The Message of SECHEPKRA" [Sazeman-e Cherikha-ye Feda'i-e Khalq--Feda'yan-e Khalq Organization] issued to Iran's radio and TV). A few months later they recognized the sovereignty as the follow-up of that of the Shah's period calling his [Imam's] action in the interest of the United States (statement issued in response to the speech by Hojjatolislam Rafsanjani on 22/2/58 [12 May 1979], and the Organization's communique entitled "Long Live the United Action of all Progressive Forces Against Imperialism and Reactionaries," dated 26/4/58 [15 July 1979]).

After the occupation of the nest of the American spies by Moslem students, followers of the Imam line, the organization, after a period of undecision, retracted and tacitly accepted the principle of sovereignty of the Islamic Republic (page 2 of the resolution of 4 Azar [25 Nov] issued on the occasion of the march towards the house of spies). Then, after they realized that they could not reap benefit from their propaganda against the armed forces, and the security forces of the Islamic Republic and that their cruel and mass murders in Kordestan and their massacre in the towns of Paveh and Mehabad did not achieve any results, they suddenly changed to that of followers of the line of the Imam (Organization's communique dated 5/11/58 [27 Jul 79] in which they wished continued good health to Ayatollah Khomeyni). This shows how steadfast, consistent and principled are the Feda'yan-e Khalq.

This is what we would like to analyze in this article and prove that their idea of the "line of the Imam" is nothing but treachery that Feda'yan-e Khalq have learned from their predecessor, the Tudeh Party, in an effort to cover up for their treachery and crimes they have committed in the past 2 years. This is well known to the Iranian people and they must stand ready to answer for their crimes.

It may still be remembered that a few days after the establishment of the provisional government, the Feda'ians called for a demonstration march, which was immediately condemned by the Imam. It was then that the organization realized that achieving their goals was not an easy task. Their efforts, aimed at recovering from that defeat, showed their real character. They then began opposing the Imam openly and carried their actions to a point where, as a result of their agitations, first internal clashes following the revolution, began in Esfand 57 [22 Feb-21 Mar 78] and in Farvardin 58 [22 Mar-21 Apr 78]. These clashes took place in Sananda and Gonbad-e Kavus in which a large number of Revolutionary Guards and army personnel were killed on the one side, and a great number of innocent residents of the area fell victim to the greed of these mercenaries.

From then on, Feda'yan-e Khalq created such havoc in various cities in Iran and especially in Kordestan that history will never forget those treacheries. On the one side, the cries of the Moslem Kurds were answered by their massacre and mass graves. On the other, agents of Oveysi and Palizban were given a free field, thus creating the most suitable conditions for the anti-Islamic activities of these American agents.

In any case, events in Kordestan are the best examples of criminality and cruelty of the leaders of the Feda'yan-e Khalq such as Mostafa Madani, Keshtgar, Roqiyeh Daneshgari, Negahdar and.... Ever since the fighting of Nowruz 58 (Mar 79) in Sananda, they have killed a large number of Revolutionary Guards, members of the same group who are now the biggest obstacle against Iraqi and American imperialism and who, with the least possibilities at their disposal, are fighting against Russian-made Iraqi tanks and force them to withdraw.

Their treachery is not confined to crimes committed in Kordestan. Their old enmity and hostility towards Islam and the enlightened religious leaders is not something that could be dismissed lightly. For example, let us point to some insults and vulgarities that they have thrown at Religious Guardian-Jurisprudent (Velayat-e Faqih), the position now held by Imam Khomeyni.

In their publication KAR, issue 34, dated Aban 58 [23 Oct-21 Nov 79], following the passage of the principle of the Religious Guardian-Jurisprudent in the Assembly of Experts, they wrote: "With the passage of the principle of the Religious Guardian-Jurisprudent, the puppet-show in the Assembly reached its climax." Headlines such as this reflected their fear of the leadership of committed and principled religious leaders, now headed by Imam Khomeyni.

The leaders of the Organization who during that period, meaning from early Esfand 57 to early Azar 58 [Mar-Nov 79], were showing their true criminal nature and were doing everything to weaken the Islamic Republic, with the occupation of the American embassy and the clear stand taken by the Imam of the people with regards to the United States, suddenly realized that they were in danger of losing their supporters and even coming close to the point of disintegration. They therefore, in spite of their past record of treachery, with the advice of their good old father, meaning the "non-aligned" Tudeh Party, adopted a new policy and method. After having unsuccessfully tried to deal blows at the Islamic Republic by means of confrontation, realized their weaknesses and reached a dangerous decision.

Taking advantage of the experiences of their "Tudeh friends," they resorted to the peaceful method. They tried to fool the public and turned to defenders of the Imam's line presenting themselves as the true supporters of the Islamic Republic and the Revolutionary Guards.

Following the Imam's line and the Division in the SECHEFKHA was the title of a new play [policy?] planned by Comrade Suslov, the Soviet Communist Party theoretician. The play consisted of three acts which was staged in 6 months time. The first act was the gradual inclination of the Organization towards the line of the Imam and the tacit support of the revolutionary organs which took 4 months to complete. In order not to shock their own true supporters, they, of course, resorted to certain analysis of their new method. The analysis, based on Marxist-Leninist points of view, were aimed at confirming the new policy. Act two opened in early Farvardin 59 [22 Mar-21 Apr 80] and consisted of the text of a scenario called "division." In this act, first a number of people in the Organization begin to protest against inclination towards the Islamic Republic and ask for readjustment. At the same time, a number of higher level members begin to express dissatisfaction with the situation and, in an article printed in the issue 61 of their publication KAR, criticize the minority group. The minority is then enraged and puts out a new KAR issue 61 with entirely different articles. (It must be noted that in this part of the play, its infidel players become panicky and get themselves in trouble. The 61st issue of the publication KAR by the minority was supposed to come out 1 week after the original issue, but it was published earlier.) At the end of this act of the play, the Organization is divided in two, three and, by some reports, to three and more branches:

1. Feda'yans (majority), or the original cadre of the Organization.
2. Feda'yans (minority), or the divisionaries by order.
3. Feda'yans (independent), or members who are confused and who do not know what is going on. This is one of the most valuable branches.

The main organization remains in the hands of the central cadre (who have turned zealous Moslems) or "SECHEFKHA--majority" with only the name of the Organization slightly changed. The third act of the play is the conversion to Islam of the infidel Feda'yans following diversion in the Organization. Ever since early Tir 59 [22 Jun-22 Jul 80], the Organization has been increasingly leaning towards the government, position of the Imam and revolutionary organs. At the same time it continues to support openly the fraternal country, meaning the Soviet Union, and gradually reveals its alliance with the so-called independent (non-aligned) Tudeh Party.

What is important at this stage is the demagogic propaganda conducted by SECHEFKHA (majority). Our people and the authorities must know that SECHEFKHA (majority), by its present propaganda, which is a true example of the propaganda method of the Tudeh Party, tries to present a criminal and anti-Islamic organization as a harmless group. The people and authorities must react strongly and make it known that they will never forgive a communist and godless group who have murdered our revolutionary guards, members of our armed forces and the soldiers of Islam, and who pride themselves in being anti-God and enemies of Imam Khomeyni. Their tricks will only prove the depth of their past crimes, and nothing else.



## RULES FOR DISTRIBUTION OF EMERGENCY GOODS EXPLAINED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 10 Nov 80 p 1

[Text] PARS NEWS AGENCY--In view of the special conditions in the country, and in order to distribute emergency goods in a fair manner, the Economic Mobilization Staff has begun determining quotas for a number of basic necessities of life in connection with which it has issued the following communique:

"In the first stage of the execution of the plan, and in view of the need to control supplies, consumption and the prices of basic goods, the Economic Mobilization Staff has started printing and distributing coupons. Each coupon will consist of five separable parts or pieces. The first piece is marked with the phrase "first turn A." (It must be explained that the letter "A" designates the type of the good, the name of which will be announced on radio and TV at the time of its distribution). The phrase "first turn" designates the first distribution of the "A" good. In the same manner, letters "B", "D" and "J" represent two other items that are to be distributed in this first stage of the plan. In the first stage of the implementation of the plan, quotas will be set for two items to be distributed twice and for another item that will be distributed only once. Therefore, at this stage of the fair distribution plan of goods only one five-piece coupon will be given out. It will go like this; a single person will be receiving one brown color five-piece coupon. A family of two will be given one blue-color five-piece coupon. A family of three will receive a red color one. A family of four will get a green-color coupon, and a five-person family will receive one in black color.

Note 1. A six-member family will get a coupon for two and one for four. A family of seven will get a coupon for three and one for four. Families with eight members each will get two coupons for four. Families with nine and 10 members each will be given two coupons, each designed for a five-member family. It must be pointed out that the brown color coupons will be given out upon presentation of two birth certificates, the blue color ones with three and the red coupons upon the presentation of four birth certificates, and so on.

Note 2. The head of each family can collect the coupons and it is not necessary to bring the rest of his family. He can receive the coupons simply by bringing along a copy of the birth certificate of each member of his household to the branch of Bank-e Saderat in the cities, or to the farm cooperatives in rural areas. Distribution of coupons throughout the country will begin on the morning



of Wednesday, 21 Aban [12 Nov 1980] by various branches of Bank-e Saderat in cities and towns, and by farm cooperatives in rural areas.

In Tehran, because of the large number of families in the city, coupons could be collected by any member of the family simply by presenting copies of the birth certificates of the family members. Coupons will be given out by branches of Bank-e Saderat from 8 a.m. until 2 p.m. every day.

Coupons will be distributed in the following manner:

To one and nine-member families, on Wednesday, 21 Aban [12 Nov 80].

To two and six-member families, on Thursday, 22 Aban [13 Nov 80].

To three and seven-member families, on Friday, 23 Aban [14 Nov 80].

To four and eight-member families, on Saturday, 24 Aban [15 Nov 80].

To five and 10-member families, on Sunday, 25 Aban [16 Nov 80].

In the meantime, families of 10 or more, and those, who for any reason, have not been able to collect their coupons, will be able to collect them on Monday, 26 Aban [17 Nov 80], by presenting copies of birth certificates of their households to Bank-e Saderat branches in the cities and to farm cooperatives in the villages.

Bank-e Saderat and farm cooperatives have been instructed to stamp the back of each birth certificate bearing the holders' photos upon the delivery of the coupons.

At the same time, the bank and farm cooperatives have been instructed to collect 20 rials from every family upon the distribution of the coupons.

The Economic Mobilization Staff.

9561

CSO: 4906

## ISRAEL

### ISRAELI-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP IN MIDDLE EAST ANALYZED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 16, 19 Oct 80

[Article by Yigael Wagner: "Partnership of Interests or Sword for Hire?"]

[16 Oct 80, p 11]

[Text] "The only objective of the official policy has been to achieve peace agreements . . . if the British are interested, in terms of their interests, in the Suez Canal that we should strike a blow at the Egyptian Army . . . then on that part of the road, our interests will coincide with their interests" (Menahem Begin in an interview for HA'OLAM HAZEH, No. 858, March 1954).

Can the Land of Israel alone be here the "long arm" of England, without support in the Arab countries, perhaps in an environment in which opposition and disappointment are prevalent? Can and does England want to support this "hand" and protect it? (Moshe Bailinson, DAVAR, 19 January 1929).

The Israeli public until now has believed that the government which was in power in Israel at the time of the "deficiency" of the Yom Kippur War, and specifically the minister of defense in that government, was responsible for it. The Agranat Commission placed the blame on the military level. It was the object of much scorn and suspicion because of this, and many pointed to the too close relationship of its members to the minister of defense of the Yom Kippur War. This tone became stronger here and there to the point of an outcry with the premature death of the chief of the General Staff of the Yom Kippur War, Dado, of Blessed Memory.

However, even with the great and directed effort of the power of the imagination, no one apparently speculated until now that the blame for the Yom Kippur deficiency would be placed on the echelon of . . . the then Israeli ambassador in Washington (Hagai Ashad, "When Did the Deficiency Begin?" DAVAR, 19 September 1980).

It is true that it is possible to find good reasons in the politics of today to blame Rabin for every deficiency. A negative reason: the "deficiency" "proves" that Rabin is not suitable for diplomacy, and it is only by mistake that he is regarded by the public as being the most suitable to conduct the foreign and defense policy of Israel. A positive reason: The farther removed the "deficiency" is from Moshe Dayan, the easier it will be for the Alignment prime minister in the future, if he is a friend of Dayan, to give him, for example, a special role in the negotiations with the Palestinians, a role which Dayan has already publicly expressed his readiness to take on.

However, if blaming Rabin for the "beginning of the deficiency" of the Yom Kippur War is in itself a surprising and ludicrous subject, in terms of the political-strategic conception which serves as a justification and basis for this charge, it is not a laughing matter at all. This is not the first time that Hagai Ashad has laid out this conception for his readers, however it seems that this time he has exposed its profound assumptions more than before, and there is reason to dwell on these at greater length.

It is only proper to point out that Hagai Ashad is not simply placing the blame on Rabin. In his eyes, Rabin is only one of the representatives of a concept, and the Yom Kippur War is only one episode in a political policy which he rejects. He believes, and with justification, that this concept and this policy dominated all the governments of Israel from the Six-Day War until the last Alignment government. His main argument is that the original and true deficiency which led, among other things, also to the Yom Kippur War is the making of Israeli power available for the expansion of American influence in the Middle East without Israel receiving and even asking for a substantive quid pro quo for these military-political services. He characterizes this policy also by contrasting it with the Sinai operation exemplifying the opposite policy and, in his opinion, the correct and wise one. "One can remember, for the purpose of comparison, that the Sinai operation was preceded by extensive and explicit consultation between Israel and France on the objectives, dangers, precautionary measures, and security guarantees in the event of success and in the event of failure."

His comparison to the Sinai operation is not accidental. Explicit consultation, guarantees, pre-planning and so forth, were not present, according to him, in the Yom Kippur War and not in the entire policy which led to it and which was adopted afterwards. In his book on the "shameful deal," he explains that several years after the Sinai operation, "there began the transition from the policy of military restraint . . . to the exaggerated saber-rattling of the Eshkol-Rabin leadership. There is a deep chasm between the short and purposeful Sinai operation, which was the acme of a well thought out fruitful policy, and the ill-considered Six-Day War, which has not ended." (H. Ashad, "Who Gave the Order?", 1979 p 16).

Moving the "deficiency" many years backward is a part of Ashad's basic thinking. From the point of view of Israel, the Six-Day War, the War of Attrition, and the Yom Kippur War were sterile and useless. Why? Because they were not the result of explicit consultation and pre-planning reactions to aggression. This was not the case with the Sinai operation, the advantage of which, according to Ashad, was precisely in the fact that it was not in the category of a direct reaction to Arab aggression. It is true that there is also difficulty here: The Sinai War also did not prevent the deterioration to another war. Moving the "deficiency" many years backward permits Ashad to answer this fact by separating the Sinai War, which in itself exemplified political wisdom, from its political results, the responsibility for which is placed on the diplomats of the deficiency: "The MAPAI hierarchy disrupted the reaping of the political, strategic, technological, and economic fruits of the Sinai operation from within and without." ("Who Gave the Order?" p 16).

In "This Time Tomorrow", jointly written by Shimon Peres and Hagai Ashad, we find this sharp formulation of the contrast between the two policies: "The Sinai operation did not nurse from panic and was not strangled by an excessive appetite." (This Time Tomorrow", 1978, p 73).

It seems therefore that Hagai Ashad's concept is opposed to a policy of defensive war which by its very nature is unplanned and is not the result of consultation--and the preventive war is preferred. It is opposed to the preemptive counterattack (which was launched in 1967) and "military restraint" is preferred. It is opposed to the seizure of the territories for the purpose of using most of them as bargaining cards for a peace settlement which would give Israel new defensible borders. In short, H. Ashad rejects the policy which was adopted by the Eshkol, Golda, and Rabin governments, and he favors another direction which has been gaining strength since the Six-Day War in order to negate this policy.

According to his article, the failure of the Egyptian War of Attrition against Israel was the main factor which moved Egypt from a Soviet orientation to an American one. A main factor in this defeat was the deep-penetration bombings in Egypt, whose most prominent advocate was the Israeli ambassador in Washington. According to the Article, the terrorist organizations were concerned about the American-Egyptian cease-fire and worked against Husayn, the other pro-American partner among Israel's neighbors. Israel responded to Husayn and the United States and prevented Syria from intervening when Husayn was destroying the terrorist organizations in his country.

According to various pieces of evidence, Dayan was not enthusiastic about these two pro-American actions, in which Rabin was an initiator and partner. These actions, which were taken in accordance with the Six-Day War school, were pro-American. Hagai Ashad is opposed to the American orientation of this school while contrasting it with the French orientation of the period of the Sinai operation and the Soviet operation, which he recommends, as we will see later.

It is also evident from Hagai Ashad's descriptions, although not with sufficient clarity, that the address of the orientation and the nature of the orientation are intertwined. He is opposed to the American orientation not only because it is American but because of its specific nature. Rabin views the connection between the supporting power and Israel's going to war differently than Hagai Ashad. Rabin does not wait for an inducement by the United States in the case of a defensive war. There were forces in the United States who were interested in breaking the blockade and in Israel's launching the Six-Day War, however it alone had to make the decision. This was the case also regarding the deep-penetration bombings in Egypt. Rabin insisted that the Americans request Israel's aid when what was involved was not Israel's defense but Husayn's rescue.

The partnership with America which Rabin has fostered since serving as ambassador has been based on the fact that America's influence in the Middle East is not aimed at subduing the Arabs, in cooperation with Israel, but rather to spread out also among the Arabs. According to the school with which Rabin is associated, America's influence must be toward pushing for the rise of a more moderate leadership which would put the Arab peoples on the road of economic development. The development needs, by its very substance, the peace settlements in order to be possible and the active support of the United States in order to be implemented. Rabin and his partners in this school are not ready to be excessively moved by the hatred as a key motive of the Arab rulers, and they are building on the Arab realism (since they are not mystics and racists, they assume that the Arabs, like other peoples, have an option of political realism). When one abandons the hope of destroying Israel, he will prefer a settlement of the conflict and prefer development and progress over an



endless destructive struggle. All of these conditions, abandoning a military solution, a settlement, and development can only be provided by the United States. "In contrast to this, American influence has been on the rise for several years. "This is a result of its success in establishing limitations on the Arab countries' right for effective intervention in its basic commitment to Israel on the one hand and its ability to aid in finding a solution to the conflict on the other hand. This is, of course, in addition to the capability and readiness of the United States to aid the Arab countries who need to help themselves in the development of their countries without endangering their independence." (Yigal Allon, MIGVAN, October 1977).

[19 Oct 80, p 13]

[Text] This basic difference between the concept expressed by Hagai Ashad and that of the political leadership of Rabin and his partners is in the character of the desired relations with the big power with which it is associated. While Ashad knocks Israel's pretension as a "strategic asset" of the United States in helping Husayn against Syria and the terrorists in 1970, Allon and Rabin were proud of it (Allon, MIGVAN, *ibid.*; Rabin "Service Book", p 314).

According to Ashad, the big power orientation means Israel's readiness to serve as an instrument in the hands of a foreign power in the constant struggle for domination in the area in exchange for compensation by that power in the form of defense guarantees and so forth. Therefore, he talks constantly in his articles about the partition of the Middle East between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result, he views Egypt's change of orientation toward the United States only as the basis for the Yom Kippur War and not as a reversal toward reconciliation with Israel. Rabin, as Ashad quotes him, supported the deep-penetration bombings not as a service to the Americans for which we would get something "from them" but first and foremost as a policy "for its own good and the good of the United States." Rabin, like his friend the late Allon, based his American orientation on the assumption that there is a basic American interest in the Middle East which requires development in the region and a concentration of the political interests around the development motives. For the long term, therefore, there can be created an overlapping of interests instead of the existing opposition between the peoples of the Middle East and between them and the United States. Therefore, Israel must direct its policy at the prevention of extremism and the strengthening of moderate rulers and trends to give priority to constructive objectives.

"Israel did not designate itself the policeman in the Middle East . . . however it must be remembered that Israel is interested in peace and stability in the region no less than the United States . . . Moreover, I dare say that there is an objective identity of interests--even though it is still not recognized sufficiently--between Israel and the many Arab countries. There is no doubt that their economic and cultural progress and the guarantee of their national independence are dependent to a crucial extent on the prospects for peace between the Arab countries themselves and between Israel and them." (Allon, *ibid.*).

On the one hand, the Allon-Rabin school maintains that Israel is not the policeman of the Middle East, not even for the United States, and on the other hand, it assists the Americans. How is this possible? Very simple. Israel works only in that

direction in the American policy which aids it in its struggle for security and peace, in its struggle to push the region toward a period of peace and development. A vital condition for realizing this perspective is the weakening of the Soviet hold in the region, which is likely to eventually bring the Soviet Middle East policy also into the circle of detente.

Hagai Ashad has completely different position. "It is difficult to see any form of detente in the Middle East which is not within the framework of a partition agreement." (DAVAR, "When to Go to Geneva", 5 January 1975). During the negotiations for the interim agreement with Egypt, he writes that after this agreement "there will be a reason to drop the tactic of progress in which priority is given to American mediation between Israel and the Arabs, which is also the American effort to push the Soviets out . . . Israel must already now consider what is more dangerous to it, what is worthwhile for it . . ." This is his position also 5 years later, after the American policy, aided by Israel's, has drastically reduced the hold of the Soviet Union in the Middle East: "Peace and security will not be established . . . in the Middle East in the Arab-Israeli conflict without partition . . . into delineated areas of influence. This is the objective of the Soviet attack in Asia. Such a partition is in the category of a prerequisite for the building of peace and security between Israel and its neighbors. An Arab-Israeli peace agreement and an exclusive American guarantee cannot guarantee this." (DAVAR, 9 September 1980). Hagai Ashad does not deceive his reader regarding the character of the "peace" which will be guaranteed with such a partition of the Middle East: "A system of locations which will prevent flare-ups and fighting beyond agreed upon circles, in accordance with the model of controlled and gradual escalation in a nuclear flare-up which serves as the basis for the flimsy consultations and understandings between the super powers." (DAVAR, 3 January 1975).

What is astounding here is that the same author who seeks to have the objective of Israeli policy identical with "the objective of the Soviet attack in Asia," and who gives Israel the role of a battlefield within a "controlled and agreed upon circle" which would permit the big powers to play the "flimsy consultation" game between them and prevent the spread of the fighting to their field, is the one who himself accuses Yitzhaq Rabin and the political school which he continues of selling Israel's services to the United States without adequate compensation.

Of course, the real dispute is not over the price of the services but rather over the character of the relations and the character of the connection with the big power outside the region in the form of a "sword for hire." This is the real dispute, and it is doubtful if Hagai Ashad understands it. The scope of the historical misunderstanding of that which is being expressed [is evident] in his repeated assertion that inter-super power detente in the Middle East must be based on a partition "as in Europe." There is no greater mistake. The partition of Europe was an act of war, of a major hot war (the World War), and of a cold war which lowered an "iron curtain" between the peoples and placed their lives in the shadow of a holocaust of fear and endless "local" conflicts. World detente came precisely in order to overcome and end this situation without making the matter dependent on a change in the given territorial partition. It is not the partition of Europe that is the basis for detente but rather the attempt to rebuild a European partnership beyond the given partition.

Does Hagai Ashad believe that the desired partition would really solve the problems and create constructive neighborly relations within a system of "controlled escalation" and localized fighting within "agreed upon circles?" Certainly not. He himself says: "Such a partition of the Middle East is likely to give the Arab-Israeli conflict stability, which is based on the prevention of war in the absence of a solution, in accordance with the European model in which a status quo has been created without the German problem, for example, and also other problems being solved." (DAVAR, 5 January 1975). He is seeking to give stability to . . . a conflict!

If the United States has interests and aspirations in the Middle East, Hagai Ashad regards them only as an interest in partition, in a cut. When he sees that this is not their objective, he becomes suspicious. If they do not want a cut, it is only because they do not want Israel as a cut, which means they want to abandon it. If they want a cut in the Middle East, they must bid for it against the Soviet Union, and they are ready to compete for it. This he is ready to accept. He also accepts the conclusion that the competition with the Soviet Union over the cut for each big power will be in the hands of the countries of the Middle East: Every Middle Eastern country will become involved as a client in the great competition of the "masters of the house." Fighting will not spread beyond its and its neighbors' circle. However, should the Americans' not wanting a cut mean that they want "everything," do they want to fight over this with the Soviet Union? This is in complete contravention to all possible detente. For "everything," they will have to fight by themselves because in truth they will be unable to satisfy such a large appetite with the help of clients. These will be good only against other clients of the other side in the game. Then, what will the clients do? Their price has dropped to zero! H. Ashad is in a quandary. He cannot imagine that a big power like the United States would want "everything" and yet--it is not in the status of a "cut"; that it wants detente with the Soviet Union also in the Middle East, that is to say Soviet support for a regional policy with a character other than imperialist competition for cuts and clients. On the "realistic" world map of Hagai Ashad, there are simply no reference points of a time later than that of the 19th century with its colonial competitions.

In contrast, Rabin explains in summarizing the events of 1970 (which Ashad deals with) that the American policy then was about to give in to the Soviets and Egypt and that the result of this policy, had it been adopted, would have been the delivery of the Middle East, except for Israel and perhaps another country or two, into the hands of the Soviet Union:

"In contrast to the assumption that in such a situation the United States would have placed its trust in Israel and showered it with unlimited money and political support, I believe that our situation would have become serious to the point of a real danger. The United States would have been forced to pay with Israeli currency . . . in an attempt to restore its status and influence among the Arab countries, and there is considerable doubt if Israel's loyalty to the United States and the loyalty of the Jews of the United States to Israel would have endured on this road." (Rabin, "Service Book", p 315).

Ashad, who grasps in his way this state of affairs but who lacks any constructive perspective of international relations and does not see the forces working in American and international policy in this direction, comes to a preference for the



orientation of the Soviet policy (with all its strivings for the acquisition of "cuts"), something which naturally requires him to reject the use of the territories as a bargaining card in the negotiations for a stable peace with the active assistance of the United States and to prefer the use of the territories as a constant source of friction with the indirect, or even direct, aid of the big power which is not interested in ending the conflict.

In an article with the meaningful title "Israel's Soviet Option," he writes: "It is useful to remember that in 1948-1949, the Soviets were vigorously opposed to tearing the Negev away from the State of Israel and even to the Israeli withdrawal from Al 'Ariah in December 1948, which was imposed on Israel by a British-American ultimatum . . . Moscow cannot rule out the possibility of a strengthening of the American-Egyptian pact to the point that at a certain stage it would be useful to her to change her position on the issue of the borders in favor of Israel even as a threat and pressure on the Arabs and the Americans." This means that it would threaten the Egyptians that it would not support the return of the administered territories and by this threat it would keep the Egyptians under its control! "It is in Israel's interest that such a possibility, as remote as it is, should be taken into account." (DAVAR, 5 January 1975).

The basic assumption of this Ashad structure, which Rabin does not accept, is that the Middle East is divided between the two big powers and the greater the threat to the American hold there the more secure will be Israel's role because then it would be recognized as a "policeman." This disagreement is an old one. It has always been the essence of the Revisionist concept regarding Zionist and Israeli foreign policy. It has always been rejected by the Labor movement and the progressive segment of General Zionism.

In speaking to the members of the British Parliament in 1937, Jabotinsky said: "We, the Revisionists, offered the mandatory power (Britain) something which was in the nature of an asset to the empire, a lucky partner to his standing on guard in the most important (and now perhaps the most dangerous) place in the empire . . . England does not have the power to rule the Middle East where the population is opposed to its rule . . . and if there is one position on the bank of the Mediterranean Sea where Europe has a chance to maintain its status, it is the Land of Israel with a Jewish majority . . . Clouds are gathering on the horizon in the east. Throughout the east there are subversions and conspiracies and it is almost certain that there will be a storm if the clouds gather on the horizon. It would be statesmanship to prepare the hand that would develop the conditions for a second opportunity for a Legion . . ."

The Jew as the Western European policeman against the east--the concept is one. Ashad's thinking appears to be less dogmatic and abstract, however he maintains, like Jabotinsky, that Israel should establish ties with a big power which needs military services in the Middle East in order to dominate its peoples, and it should receive compensation not only in weapons but in the status of a sentinel guarding interests outside of the region.

Ashad's "realism," as we have seen, leads him to consider a partition "in accordance with the European model," a situation in which no problem has been solved and which gives stability not to peace and cooperation but to conflict. However, his "realism" goes even farther: He projects that such a partition will not be possible without



another war, with such serious implications that it will force the super powers to intervene--and to partition. "It is not true that the next war will necessarily end like its predecessors, that is without an inter-big power and regional strategic decision . . . The next war is likely to end with Soviet military intervention which will be able to provide the last compulsive factor and perhaps also the clear answer to do what is unpleasant and unavoidable." (DAVAR 5 January 1975). It is not that he does not see, from the height of the Olympus of the historical inevitability on which he sits, that this development entails "the most serious dangers and heavy losses in life and property," however what can be done when the desired decision "is possible virtually only by war?" (ibid)

A terrible fear steals into one's heart upon reading these words because they are not the thoughts of an armchair strategist responsible at most for the newspaper on which they are printed and because Hagai Ashad is right in his claim that there are people of stature and power in Israeli policy who are seeking and able to steer the country in this direction.

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CSO: 4805

## ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW WEIZMAN PARTY MAY BE SUCCESSFUL

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 25 Nov 80 p 11

[Article by Professor Shevah Weiss: "Weizman's Prospects"]

[Text] Can a new movement headed by Ezer Weizman get enough public support in the elections for the Tenth Knesset?

Ezer Weizman is an anomaly in Israeli politics. In 1969 he was "parachuted" to the top of the system, when he was asked by Menahem Begin to serve as a minister in the national unity government headed by Golda Meir. Those in the know say that only a few days after he was appointed minister of transportation in that government he managed to be released from service in the IDF. Since then his star has shone and dimmed in the firmament of Israeli politics.

Half a year ago, when he presented his letter of resignation to the government, the prime minister reacted sharply, and accused the retiring minister of defense that in politics too he "takes off."

Indeed, Weizman is not one of those who are adept in the rules of what in our political game we may call the "law of the movement." And although during the past decade he did not leave his party, he did put it a few times in a difficult situation and broke unequivocally the party discipline. He is now facing a new era in his political career. He is about to go it alone.

Pundits and politicians offer the argument that after the experience of the Democratic Movement for Change, especially its breakdown and collapse, the chances in the elections for the Tenth Knesset for any new party, which is not part of the traditional political establishment are slight. Let's examine this. We do not have well tested tools besides the polls and the surveys of the last 2 years, especially the past 6 months, and the elections during that period for local government in 1978 and dozens of professional bodies and public organizations since then. We will therefore base our assumptions on this information and use our intuition as well.

The assumption that after the DMC experience a new party cannot represent the political center in Israel is erroneous. Moreover, the assumption that during the last 2 years the Israeli voters have gone back to the norms of the late 60's, when about one-half of the voters supported the Alignment, about one-quarter supported the Likud (GAHAL back then), is also erroneous. Let bear in mind that in the latest

local elections less than 60 percent of those eligible to vote exercised their right. In most public polls and public opinion surveys which were conducted in part by specialized and professional groups, some 30-40 percent were undecided. In elections to dozens of professional associations, less than half of those eligible to vote took part, despite the inflation and the unemployment and the high degree of frustration and anxiety which the economic hardships have produced. In some associations, including those of highly skilled professionals, less than 30 percent participated in the voting.

If we look objectively at these indicators, we will see that in Israel there is still a large public potential of voters who can express their frustration with the political establishment and its leadership by supporting a new political force, headed by new leadership. Besides, in the last 2 years most parties have taken a tally of their members and have added new members. According to my check, only 400,000 of those eligible to vote belong to the various parties. In the elections to the Tenth Knesset there will be 2.3 million voters, which means that only 15 percent of the voters belong to the existing parties. Better yet, not only did more people belong to parties in the past (about 30 percent of the adult population belonged to parties in the early 60's), they also had more steady and ardent supporters. Political culture in Israel today is characterized by people who do not like their own party. Israel has become a state of "floating votes." Who knows where those votes are going to float to in the election to the Tenth Knesset.

There is an uncertainty today in Israel as to what the actual popular support of the various political leaders is. Mr Begin still enjoys the support of large segments of the population, but his political confederation is in deep partisan and personal crisis. The Labor Party is now in the midst of internal elections. In these elections delegates will be picked who will decide at the convention in late December between Peres and Rabin. The question of the leadership of the Labor party is not yet settled. What can be expected at this point is that there may be a disagreement between the will of the people and the decision of the majority of the convention delegates.

Thus, the political field is still open for change. It should also be mentioned that a good part of the young generation, especially those groups which were active in the "Peace Now" movement, could, under certain circumstances, see Ezer Weizman as their spokesman, even if he does not become officially associated with them.

Therefore anyone who decides that the chances of a party headed by the likes of Ezer Weizman are not good--in view of the experience of the recent past--may miss the mark. The DMC was in the past mainly the party of the academicians and the middle and upper middle class. A party headed by Ezer Weizman and by known leaders from the Sephardic community, may also draw substantial support from the residents of development towns.

One may ask whether such a party will, if successful, improve political life in Israel. There is no doubt in my mind that the central problem in the Israeli system today stems from the difficulty of establishing a government based upon a solid parliamentary foundation. An excessive splintering in the Tenth Knesset will make things worse. It is the duty of the major parties, especially the Alignment, which has the best chance of forming the next government, to make a supreme effort to

insure a Knesset in which the government has a decisive majority without needing a broad coalition, or a coalition which is based on two or three stable public powers. If the members of the Alignment, especially the members of the Labor party, see to it in the near future that they do everything within their powers to elevate their party and gain the confidence of their rank and file and of the majority of the population, the fragmentation of the Tenth Knesset can be avoided.

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CSO: 4805



## DECLINE REPORTED IN KIBBUTZ INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 17 Nov 80 p 10

[Article: "Drastic Decline in Growth of Kibbutz Industrial Exports in 1980"]

[Text] A drastic decline in the growth of the exports of kibbutz industries occurred in the first 9 months of 1980. The total export is 43 percent of the same period last year, and it reaches 152 million dollars compared to 105 million in the first 9 months of 1979.

The coordinator of kibbutz industry, Gideon (Dud) Duda'y, reported that in the first quarter of 1980 there was a 100 percent growth in exports compared to the first quarter in 1979. In the second quarter there was a slowdown in growth, which only reached 76 percent of the second quarter of 1979. In the third quarter which ended last September there was a further decline in growth, reaching only 25 percent of the third quarter of 1979. In kibbutz industry circles it is being argued that the drastic decline in export growth is the result of worsening export conditions and the constant cuts in incentives given to exporters. The association of kibbutz industries is quite concerned about the slowdown in export growth and is now discussing the implications from the economic standpoint and in terms of the continued development of the kibbutz industries.

The exports of kibbutz industries in the first 9 months of 1980 consisted of plastics and rubber (50 million dollars), metal (37 million), food (33 million), wood and furniture (16 million), electric and electronic products (5 million), textile and leather (3 million), as well as art, optics, drugs, and chemical products. The number of enterprises which export their products increased their year to 207, out of a total of 320.

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CSO: 4805

## AGRICULTURAL GROWTH REPORTED AT STANDSTILL

Tel Aviv 'AL HANISHMAR in Hebrew 6 Nov 80 p 8

[Article by Y. Galili: "Tnuvah Director General: Real Growth in Agriculture Has Stopped; Subsidy Removal Caused Fall in Milk Production"]

[Text] "In 1980 there has been no real growth in agricultural production, despite a 2 percent growth in 1979 and 4.5 percent in 1978. During the last 3 years there has been a clear tendency to limit agricultural production because of the treasury's fiscal policy in regard to credit, the high inflation rate and the decline in profit." This was reported by Tnuvah's Director General Yitzhak Landsman during the cooperative's meeting in Tel Aviv.

The director said that the decline in milk and milk products reached 13 percent—630 million liter as compared to 723 million liter before the subsidy was stopped. Since the stopping of the subsidy the use of milk powder has declined by 60 percent and the drying of the powder went up by 268 percent, some 10 percent of all the milk monthly dried (5.5 million liter).

The reduction of subsidy for frozen chicken has reduced the work of industrial slaughterhouses, and because of the large import of frozen meat during December 1979–July 1980, a supply of 2200 tons was accumulated.

Because of the removal of subsidies for eggs in March 1979, profits declined sharply and resulted in failing to meet the eggs quota for 1980–81 which had been set at 1.3 million units.

### Did Not Catch Up with Inflation

Tnuvah took in in 1980 34 billion pounds compared to 15.5 billion in 1979, a rise of 120.6 percent—while the consumer price index in 1980 went up 123.5 percent.

### Demanding Organized Marketing

At the end of his remarks Yitzhak Landsman called for conserving the organized marketing which is vital for the farms and for Tnuvah. In light of the erosion in organized marketing the settlement movements should act to improve the situation, he added.

The Tnuvah assembly ended adopting a series of resolutions after deliberations by the members of the assembly.

It was decided among other things to demand that the government pay the target price for all the milk produced in 1980-81 to reach the ceiling agreed by the industry planning body, namely, 650 million liter. Another resolution calls upon the settlement movements to work for increased awareness of organized marketing and calls upon the moshavim to change their resolution of "no obligation to market its members' products only through Tnuvah."

The assembly approved the 1979 financial report.

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## BRIEFS

**WESTERN GALILEE EMPLOYMENT**--The employment situation in the western Galilee, which is served by 11 employment offices, of which 6 are in minority villages, serving a population of 260,000 inhabitants, of whom 128,000 are Jews and 132,000 are minorities, has worsened during the past year. The number of those who seek employment--mostly Jews--was 2126 in October compared to 1330 in October of last year. Only 786 workers were called in compared to 955 last year, of which 80 were not provided, compared to 265 last year. Those unemployed for 6 or more days was 808 compared to a few dozen last year. This was the summary of the director of regional employment in the western Galilee, Eliyahu Smuhah, at the meeting of the public council of the regional employment office, over the weekend in Acre, which was presided by Naftali Meir and attended by the heads of the local authorities of Acre, Naharia, and Karmiel, and the secretaries of the workers' councils in these towns and in Ma'alot. Smuhah said in referring to the demand for industrial workers in the coming months, that there is a good chance for additional 500 jobs. He pointed out the difficulty in increasing employment in Acre, which has no land for new industry, and which had to shut down some of existing plants. The secretary of Karmiel's workers' council, Ezra Pik, stressed the employment problems in his town. The number of those seeking jobs in his town, which has absorbed a relatively large number of new immigrants, reached 420, of whom 238 were out of work 6 or more days. Employment in Karmiel and in other development towns is based on interregional commuting. A round trip from Karmiel to the industrial area in Haifa costs the worker 180 pounds, which makes it unprofitable. [Text] [Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 10 Nov 80 p 8] 9565

**DEVELOPMENT TOWN SETTLERS**--During the last 2 years 5921 families left central Israel and settled in development towns--twice as many as in the previous 2 years. This was reported by Zohar Gendal, director of the steering center for development towns at a press conference in Be'er Sheva. He added that 2845 families settled in the Negev, due to the availability of housing and employment as well as incentives for development town settlers, offered by the ministers' committee for development towns, headed by Deputy Prime Minister Yigael Yadin. The head of the steering center for development towns stressed that while in the past people settled in development towns because of a better quality of living, now the main reason is housing, which has become a serious problem in central Israel. [Text] Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 10 Nov 80 p 8] 9565



# PHALANGE SEEN TRANSCENDING 'RIFT' WITH LIBERALS

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 24-30 Nov 80 p 15

/Article: "The Lebanese Front: Political Pluralism and Military Unity"/

/Text/ Last week the Lebanese Front took a broad step toward the restoration of solidarity between the Phalange and Liberal Nationalist Parties, which in the past months had been shaken as a result of the bloody skirmishes that occurred between armed men of the two parties in al-Ashrafiyah, al-Safra, Jubayl, 'Ayn al-Rummanah and Furn al-Shubbak.

The front apparently managed to transcend the "rift" which almost threatened the future of the alliance between the two parties and turned them from allies into enemies.

That occurred last Wednesday when the front, at a meeting attended by Camille Chamoun and Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, approved the bases for the union of the two military forces of the parties in the context of a "Lebanese Front" united command which Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil had for a long time declared had to be established, especially after the 7 July Movement which eliminated a large part of the Liberals' military power. The latest 'Ayn al-Rummanah events finished off what was left of that power.

The call Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil directed to his "old comrade in arms and friend," Mr Danny Chamoun, to continue along the road together, is considered an indication of the fact that the efforts made to bring the viewpoints of the two men closer have made big positive strides.

## Sections of the Operation

The fact is that these efforts began after the al-Safra events; the head of the Lebanese monastic order, Abby Bulus Nu'man, who is linked to both by firm bonds, participated in them in particular. However, the acceleration of events during this period and the occurrence of incidents in a number of areas prevented the meeting and prompted Mr Chamoun to travel abroad and distance himself from the domestic atmosphere. The latest 'Ayn al-Rummanah incidents occurred in his absence, and his failure to appear quickly in order to remedy it was considered a sort of desire not to embark again on problems which could enlarge the gap between the Phalange and the Liberals.

In this regard, well-informed sources say that President Chamoun wanted to keep his son isolated from what went on recently, in an attempt to put a limit to the bloodshed and leave a tenuous connection between the two parties, because he knew, as these sources say, that the country's future and the status of the Maronite sect in it made it necessary to ignore the disputes and try as far as possible to keep the Maronites in solidarity as a military force in the midst of an atmosphere where there were signs of schemes to liquidate and assimilate them, and schemes to change the geographic and political landmarks.

At that time President Chamoun, for re-establishing a firm alliance with the Phalange and reuniting the armed forces of the two parties in the context of "the Lebanese Forces," imposed the condition that a single military organization be created which was subject to the political command of the front, that responsibilities in the organization be divided equally, and that its activities set forth from political decisions which he would agree with Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil over, so that interpretations, exploitations and misunderstandings would be avoided. The chief of the front also imposed the condition that the arms which had been in his partisans' hands be returned as well as the party centers and that a clear action plan with comprehensive specific goals not confined to a narrow party context be set forth.

#### Freedom in the Union

Front sources stated that the military unification decision announced last week would be followed by the political declaration of the front charter, now that the causes which until very recently prevented its declaration have eliminated the problems of agreement on political positions.

The charter notes an emphasis on the total independence of each of the parties in the front regarding local and regional political positions which are not incompatible with military orientations; in other words, it notes that each party will have freedom of political movement and independence of political decisionmaking regarding political questions, provided that their decision will be the same on matters connected to the political future of Lebanon and the basic options for Christians, whom the front aspires to represent on a broad comprehensive scale. Decisions on military matters will be unified, as will implementation, on condition that they be inspired by the united political positions of the front.

The question which political circles have raised following the declaration of the decision to unify the military apparatus of the front concerned the nature of the front's relations to the regime following this step and the new viewpoint through which it will act.

It may be difficult to answer this question accurately because events are proceeding with a speed which makes the opportunity of proving specific data an imprecise matter. However, what has been established is that the front has become politically stronger and that a single bloc had been restored. The regime will not be able to benefit from contradictions in the two parties as it had in the past. This, in the event real cooperation continues, means that the regime will face an effective political force on political and military levels and will think twice before venturing on steps which do not enjoy the support of this force, especially

if it wants to apply attitudes related to the situation in regions which the Lebanese Front and the Lebanese Forces dominate.

Therefore some parties in the front consider that the regime in dealing with the front, must review old accounts and follow a new platform which will take the new political and military circumstances into account.

As regards the repercussions of the union on other political parties in the country, these have brought nothing new, since the groups which are the declared enemies of the front will maintain their positions, in fact will become more rigid, and the possibility of opening any dialogue seems difficult in the present circumstances in the midst of the current local, regional and Arab conditions. However, the fear of embarking on dramatic steps which will draw the wheels back with the purpose of gaining an impetus which will provide them with scope, positions and capabilities remains.

11887

CSO: 4802

# FRENCH DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN CURRENT CRISIS EXAMINED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 24-30 Nov 80 pp 12, 13

/Article by Emil Khuri: "A Secret Session on a Fire without Smoke: France Develops Legitimacy in the Lebanese, Arab and American Contexts"/

/Text/ Is it true that France is playing a specific role to soften the crisis in Lebanon, since it is not possible for a country to bear the crisis in isolation, as it has ramifications into which regional and international considerations enter? What is this role?

It has been noted that France's ambassador to Lebanon, Mr De La Mare, has made repeated visits to President Ilyas Sarkis and Minister Fu'ad Butrus and has described the subjects the discussion dealt with in these visits as extremely important-- without disclosing the nature of these subjects.

He left Beirut for France by invitation of his government, stayed 10 days, then returned to continue his diplomatic activities by visiting a number of senior Lebanese officials and political leaders; however, nothing has leaked out about the real nature of the role France is playing through its ambassador in Beirut.

A week ago, the Lebanese government invited its ambassador in Paris, Dr Butrus Dib, for consultations on the steps France is taking on behalf of Lebanon and to evaluate the results of international and Arab contacts in that regard.

AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WAL-DUWALI has tried to ferret out the true nature of these contacts, ascertain the role France is playing and determine whether, if the key to the solution is abroad, it is in France's hands or in the hands of Damascus in the Arab context and Washington in the international context.

Sources close to the contacts and activities which the French ambassador in Beirut and the Lebanese ambassador in Paris are making say that the French government is trying to help the Lebanese authorities move the Lebanese crisis along, if only in its domestic context, in order to create a comprehensive solution to the crisis in its domestic and foreign contexts. No single country, France or even America, is strong enough to create one, since such a solution would be linked to the Middle East crisis.

Therefore, French efforts and moves with Arab parties, in particular Syria, and international parties, in particular America, have been confined to dealing with



the following aspects of the Lebanese crisis:

First, preventing Israel from managing, through Sa'd Haddad's forces, to expand at the expense of the region the "international forces" are dominating in the south, not just in order to inhibit the presence of these forces and prevent them from performing their tasks but also in order to prompt them to retreat, then withdraw from the south, at which point the area would be open to Israel and Sa'd Haddad's forces, Lebanon's borders with Israel would consequently be threatened with invasion and exposed to the implementation of long-standing Israeli designs against its water, and these borders would not remain stable, as the truce agreement drew them up and as they have been recognized internationally.

When Israeli and Haddadite bombardment of some international forces positions intensified, especially at the al-Naqurah site where the forces' headquarters are, with the objective of compelling the latter to withdraw, this provoked the Lebanese authorities to fear the results of such a withdrawal and provoked the French authorities to feel concern, and rapid contacts were made with Paris and Washington, covering a discussion of the possibility of sending a French strike force to protect the international forces' positions, since its presence would cause Israel and Sa'd Haddad to be apprehensive and think very carefully before hitting out at these positions.

It had been intended that France would send a force composed of 600 to 1,000 French officers and troops for this purpose, but the French authorities pulled back and contented themselves with sending just 120 troops whose task was to protect the headquarters of the international forces command in al-Naqurah alone, since the al-Naqurah headquarters are important and if, through the pressure of shelling these headquarters, Israel and Sa'd Haddad were to be able to compel the forces to abandon and evacuate the command, that would have grave implications.

To that one should add that sending a large French strike force to protect all the international forces' positions presupposes that the French command and not the United Nations command assigned to Gen Erskine would have the responsibility for giving the orders to its forces, and giving the command to the French would impose on France alone the responsibility of confronting Israel in the south, eliminate the role of the United Nations, and make the French flag, not the United Nations flag, the one that was being defended--which would mean gallicizing the international forces.

Therefore the limited French forces which were sent to the headquarters of the international forces command at al-Naqurah succeeded in guaranteeing their protection and preventing Israel and Sa'd Haddad from provoking and bombing them.

Second, stimulating the efforts the United Nations is making to revive the truce commission meetings. France is contributing seriously to these efforts through contacts which its ambassador to Israel is making.

France attaches great importance to the resumption of the joint truce committee meetings between Lebanon and Israel because that will have the effect of facilitating the international forces' task and enabling them to implement the United Nations resolutions and consecrate Israel's recognition of Lebanon's permanent borders with it.

The meetings of the truce committee would have the effect of restoring the situation along the borders between the two countries to its natural state so that security in both countries would be subject to dominance by the forces of the legitimate authorities, not by illegitimate authorities and armed organizations.

Third, participating in contacts and efforts being made locally and in the Arab context, especially with Damascus, to facilitate the task of governing and to prevent the emergence of a vacuum which would encourage statelets to implant their existence and expand their internal security scope and also striving to restore security in the capital, Beirut, as a point of departure for restoring security in all Lebanon through the legitimate authorities.

The French contacts being made to this end involve the Syrian authorities and the "Palestinian resistance."

Will France succeed in resolving the Lebanese crisis, if only in part, in its domestic aspect, or is Lebanon condemned to continue to suffer and be deprived of any solution, its Golgotha longer than that of the Messiah?

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CSO: 4802

# PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS IN WESTERN SECTION DISCUSSED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 24-30 Nov 80 pp 16-17

[Article by N.M.: "The Western District: Damascus Demands Unanimous Agreement If Its Army Is to Take Charge of Imposing Security"]

[Text] For the first time since the Arab deterrent forces came into Lebanon in 1977, the decision of the National Movement and the Palestinian resistance to close down their armed offices in the Western section of Beirut, except for the main ones, seems serious.

This does not of necessity mean that the armed offices have disappeared overnight but rather that they have diminished relatively in the short period of no more than a week. The only thing lacking in the comparison Mr Wal'd Jumblatt, head of the National Movement, made between the western section and Chicago, the traditional American criminal city, was the crime which dispatched two leaders from the Syrian National Socialist Party, Bashir 'Ubayd and Kamal Khayrbak, after the murder of Mr Munir Fathah at the hands of Mr 'Ubayd's driver because of a dispute over traffic right of way.

For the first time also the discussion between the parties to the National Front has assumed a regional character, in the sense that every party has started to talk about his region as if that belonged to it and no others.

The al-Murabitun, under the chairmanship of Mr Ibrahim Qulaylat, state that they are the first to talk about the "social security of the national masses" and the first to carry out the decision to shut down the armed offices, because their relations with their party people do not depend on the dominance of inhabitants by the rifle. They have issued statements about "people foreign" to Beirut.

This talk is not strange to the old inhabitants of Beirut; they heard it repeated many times from Premier Sa'ib Salam. However, its issuance by an organization allied with the "Palestinian resistance", a member of the "National Movement," has given the statement a special significance. The entity that is calling for the closing of offices and is speaking about the new "foreign people" is an armed organization which took part alongside its allies in the Lebanese war. Thus the political plan of the "armed bourgeoisie" and the "armed proletariat" in Beirut has become identical. It is a plan which attracts the Islamic grouping and its families, as happened recently with the combatants' law. Amal considered the talk about "social security" in Beirut to be a corrected text from the capital of its

continuous statements and its constant problem in the south, where the majority is Shiite.

However, the Syrian National Socialist Party did not consider the contents of the demand for the security of ordinary people to be contrary to what it wants, in spite of its severe rebuke of the designation "foreign people," following the battles it waged alongside the "National Movement" and the "Palestinian resistance" on the one hand, and in the face of the "Lebanese Front" parties in their areas on the other hand. If the Syrian National Socialist Party is in flight from the Lebanese Front areas, and threatened in the National Movement areas of Beirut, what will it do?

There is no doubt but that all the organizations, the Palestinian ones included, considered themselves concerned by the new orientation, which speaks for the "foreign people," while they all also acknowledged the state of lax security which the western section is experiencing, which has led to a real rift between the people and the parties.

Mr Yasir 'Arafat states to Lebanese people who visit him that controlling security in the western section is not an impossible task, but rather that it is easier than some people think. The proof is what happened in the south, when the execution of two criminals in the town of Qa'qa'iyat al-Jar greatly reduced Lebanese and Palestinian transgressions. This process could be repeated in Beirut. However, the Palestinian resistance cannot and does not want to do it, being content to be accused of wanting to settle down without assuming official security tasks--so how could it assume the task of security, even though it knows its salubrious remedy?

Mr Yasir 'Arafat has therefore been careful in his recent talks with President Hafez al-Asad to request that the Syrian forces take charge of the security missions in Beirut, now that Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil has carried out his security plan in his areas.

Mr 'Arafat told the Syrian president that the resistance was concerned with the legitimacy of the Syrian forces' security role and considered that its performance of that role would protect its relations with the people.

The Syrian president expressed his anxiety over the political plans of the leaders of the Lebanese Forces, now that they have executed their security plans. He was cited as being afraid that the political plan would extend to the legitimate Lebanese powers in terms of permanent dominance over political decisions, which would embarrass everyone. However, he did express Syria's readiness to take over security tasks in the western section of Beirut, on condition that this be the decision of everyone in the resistance and the National Movement. Syria's assumption of security tasks would mean a probable clash with some party or organization, and he, that is, President al-Asad, did not want to hear anyone subsequently coming to him to complain that he or his fellow party members were exposed to harsh treatment on the part of the Syrian forces.

Mr 'Arafat replied that he could guarantee unanimous Lebanese and Palestinian agreement that the Syrian army should carry out security missions in western Beirut and that everyone would commit himself to discipline in the face of this role.



At the end of the meeting, President al-Asad agreed to send two Syrian army companies to western Beirut to assume security tasks there, especially once the two parties had agreed that the restoration of "Syrian security" to Beirut would help the political view which asserts that it is necessary to hold the Lebanese army accountable for its responsibilities in leaving 'Ayn al-Rummanah and relinquishing it to the Phalange Party.

Heading the list of persons benefiting from the restoration of security is the new cabinet whose premier is Mr Shafiq al-Wazzan, which has not yet received a parliamentary /vote of/ confidence.

The restoration of security to the western area by legitimizing the Arab deterrent forces will make Premier al-Wazzan an interlocutory who is capable of imposing responsibility on those who are responsible for the departure of the legitimate forces from 'Ayn al-Rummanah.

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C50: 4802

# LEFTIST LEADER PROPOSES NATIONAL FEDERATION

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 24-30 Nov 80 p 17

/Article by H.K.: "Jumblatt's Federalism: Curbing the Allies and Confusing the Adversaries"/

/Text/ The talk about federalism which has issued forth from Mr Walid Jumblatt-- who is at the same time the head of the Political Council of the National Movement, head of the Socialist Progressive Party, and the most prominent Druze leader--has stirred up interest in the broadest of circles, to the point where it has been said that the president, Mr Ilyas Sarkis, considers it a major way-station from which the train of reconciliation may set forth.

The day President Canille Chamoun, head of the Lebanese Front, declared that the optimum solution to the domestic problems of Lebanon would be to rely on federalism, especially that applied in Switzerland, is not remote. Have Chamoun and Jumblatt, after the years of war, with the forces of military and political conflict they have represented, come to agree over the desired solution?

Since the outbreak of the Lebanese war, President Chamoun has missed no occasion to announce that federalism is the optimum format because it will allow each Lebanese minority to preserve its particular nature and freedom within the context of a comprehensive union. The lawyer Musa Birnis, who has seen fit to fight against partition by means of federalism, says that in the 20th century, especially in a country like Lebanon, it is "the solution which can be applied in countries which depend on decentralization, to which one must add that federalism plays a major role in providing a kind of unity for diverse entities (those composing the country) which are generally artificial, because they were combined by old colonial measures, in newly independent countries."

After the Zagharta retreat in early 1978, the Lebanese Front stressed "reliance on the plurality of Lebanese society with its genuine legacies and civilizations, as a basis for the new political structure of a united Lebanon, consolidating the absolute allegiance and preventing clashes between the Lebanese, in a manner whereby each cultural group in it would pay attention to all its affairs, especially those related to freedom, cultural, educational, financial and security affairs, social justice and its cultural and spiritual relations with the outer world, in accordance with its particular choices."

What, however, did Mr Jumblatt mean by his statement that "federalism is one of the formats under discussion," going on to say that "the solution lies in an agreement among all parties which the government will observe within the context of new motions?"

People close to Jumblatt said that he wanted to realize two objectives: first, to urge the groups allied with him to be moderate and prevent the headlong rush into auctioneering which would lead to a blowup in Lebanon, and second to threaten the front by expressing his feeling that he is able to play federalism and emerge triumphant from it if no option except that is left to him. One should realize that he continues to reiterate his commitment to the unity of Lebanon.

Other people say that the front has become accustomed to propounding solutions and that the National Movement has always been content to reject them; thus Jumblatt has resorted to an intelligent game this time, since he has faced his adversaries and allies with all options without adhering to a specific one in such a way that the National Front will not find that it has been painted into a corner or has committed itself to a worn-out format of Lebanese unity. Jumblatt is thus registering a goal with all the groups, since he is able to cope with all eventualities that arise.

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NEW PREMIER DISCUSSES COUNTRY'S POLITICAL ORIENTATION

AB181806 Paris AFP in English 1730 GMT 18 Dec 80

[Text] Nouakchott, 18 Dec (AFP)—Mauritania could be on the road to a multi-party system, according to the West African state's new Prime Minister Sidahmed Ould Bneijara, head of the civilian government.

To my mind, the establishment of democratic institutions supposes that citizens exercise a free choice between different programmes and different political organizations, Mr. Ould Bneijara said in an interview with the Nouakchott newspaper CHAAB.

From then on, it will be up to the people to create judicial and political forms aimed at providing them with sufficient guarantees against arbitrary actions and to remove definitively from our social and political system the spectre of dictatorship and oppression.

The prime minister ruled out the possibility of any appeal to the army, which overthrew the government of President Moktar Ould Daddah in July 1978, in case of serious difficulties.

He explained that the ruling military committee for national salvation remains responsible for monitoring the orientation of government activity and that the military committee and the government constitute a sole and single system of leadership.

Mr. Ould Bneijara added that his government's activity will be characterised by the rigour of its economic management and by internal policies based on a national consensus.

On the foreign front, my government intends to carry out a policy based on a sincere desire to maintain relations of good-neighbourliness, cooperation and mutual trust.

The announcement of the move to civilian government came together with that of a draft constitution agreed by the country's military rulers.

The draft constitution, which according to a statement would guarantee liberties and remove forever the threat of dictatorship, is to be put to a referendum.



## MAURITANIA

### BRIEFS

DAM PROJECT FINANCING--The European Commission of Brussels has approved a financing loan to Mauritania of \$13 million for a dam and reservoir development project. The reservoir is expected to irrigate 3,600 hectares of land for agriculture in southern Mauritania to boost the country's efforts to reduce her dependence on external food supplies. [Nouakchott Domestic Service in French 1400 GMT 7 Oct 80 AB]

CSO: 4400

OBJECTIVES OF NATO MILITARY BUILDUP IN EUROPE DISCUSSED

Aden 14 OCTOBER in Arabic 5 Nov 80 p 4

[Article by Fu'ad Hashim: "NATO and Anti-Peace Plans"]

[Text] For years, the United States and its NATO allies have been building a nuclear wall adjacent to the Soviet territories and to the other European socialist countries. Aircraft with nuclear loads, war ships, including U.S. aircraft carriers, and medium-range nuclear missiles planted in central Europe have been taking part in these vast preparations, in addition to efficient means of transportation up to par with this force. In addition to all these forces, all the British and French nuclear weapons are aimed at the Soviet Union.

For more than 4 years, the question of modernizing this military establishment has been getting the top priority in the Pentagon's and NATO's strategy and all the military spheres have been witnessing a considerable increase in military spending.

NATO has at present 5 million combat-ready troops, including 3 million in Europe divided into 70 brigades and supported by 11,000 tanks, 3,000 aircraft, 8,000 nuclear heads deployed throughout the continent and 3,000 special carriers [naqilah] for these heads.

Under the rash direction and concept which calls for "first rearmament and then disarmament negotiations," the United States and its NATO partners have built nuclear missile bases for Pershing-2 missiles and other multiple-head missiles which can reach the heart of the Soviet Union in five European countries. The United States has also put at NATO's disposal 5 submarines armed with nuclear missiles and carrying a load of 600-800 nuclear charges.

On the other hand, the United States has compelled Western Europe to turn into a strategic arsenal for its transcontinental weapons with the aim of achieving a military position in Europe superior to that of the Soviet Union. With its plans, the United States also seeks to build a missile arsenal with the capability to deal "the first blow" to the Soviet units that are supported tactically by the European socialist countries. At the same time, the United States seeks to take advantage of the rapid means of transportation it has for its nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

Europe has turned into an American nuclear hostage because the United States has made Europe the first target of any counter blow. Through this, the United States hopes to weaken the danger that may emanate as a reaction for any offensive directed from

Europe against the Soviet Union or any of the socialist bloc countries. The U.S. strategists believe that "a European strategic nuclear war" will lead to striking all their enemy's targets without exposing their country to any harm. The decision calling for the unlimited strengthening of NATO forces includes the question of improving the strategic condition of Northern Europe, meaning Norway and Denmark, and of the Turkey-Greece axis, in addition to enlisting Spain in this aggressive alliance. All this is within NATO's "long-range defense program." This is the task with which the NATO Council meeting of May 1977 emerged. The (program) includes 10 high priority issues and 120 recommendations which were approved by NATO's ministers of defense and ratified by the heads of state and of government of the NATO member countries at the meeting held in Washington at the end of 1978.

What is clearly evident in these plans is the enrichment of the war industry complexes of the member states. This is underlined by the agreements on coordinating and producing the military requirements. This issue is of major concern to the West European war industry whose companies, tied by an umbilical cord to the giant U.S. companies, produce many of the military hardware items and equipment.

Therefore, what the "modernization" actually means is a qualitative leap in the armament materials to be used against the socialist bloc and, consequently, to form the U.S. and central military system (sic) assisted by the following new elements which are still in the stage of construction:

1. Interceptor missiles, to be produced soon, manufactured especially for the B-52 bombers.
2. Installation of the new Trident-1 missiles on the nine new submarines which will enter the service in 1981.
3. Setting up an MX missiles program to guarantee protection for the strategic missiles erected on land bases.

This new direction has led to a strong competition among many of the weapon-producing establishments to win the production contracts which will undoubtedly yield enormous profits. This is where the strong pressures and call for not signing the SALT-2 stem.

Even though Norway, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Greece, Turkey and Britain, as well as France which does not constitute a part of the joint command, have increased their military spending, they are not enthusiastic for this policy and they have been making it clear in the diplomatic ways that they support the policy of detente between the east and the west. However, this inclination has motivated the United States to escalate its pressure on its European allies to convince them to adopt a unified position embodied in the "cold war" which U.S. President Jimmy Carter has already started. As a result, new agreements have been concluded with Turkey calling for providing this country with financial loans to bolster its military capabilities. Greece has also been urged to revive its military membership in NATO and efforts are being exerted to include Spain in the alliance.

This last issue is nothing new. In January 1976, Washington and Madrid concluded a 5-year cooperation treaty. The military relations of the two capitals have been strengthened and the United States can use its bases in the Spanish territories.

This makes it clear that the two countries' relations are much broader than this [sic] and that these relations are no more than the initial preparation for including Spain in NATO because Spain's geographic position enables it to overlook the oil routes and the routes of the other raw materials coming from Africa and the Middle East. At the same time, Spain will perform a reserve role in protecting these routes [instead] of the Mediterranean countries of Turkey, Greece, Malta, Portugal and Italy which are experiencing domestic troubles that make their political future unreliable. This is why the United States has always aspired to include Spain in NATO.

The Spanish minister of foreign affairs has referred to this issue by stating that in 1981, his country will request officially to enter NATO.

Naturally, there are objectives which Spain wants to realize from entering NATO, the first being its acceptance as a member of the EEC and restoring its sovereignty over Gibraltar.

In fact, Spain's inclusion in NATO means primarily a violation of the Helsinki agreement which stipulates that the military alliances shall not be expanded. At the same time, this inclusion will obstruct finally military balance in the European continent.

These aggressive measures and endeavors to speed up the armament race and to possess the modern means of collective and general death and destruction are arousing the concern of the entire world, especially of Europe which has experienced the tragedies of World Wars I & II in which Europe lost millions of men. Only the weapon manufacturers and weapon merchants will benefit from these measures and endeavors.

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CSO: 4802



PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

CHANGE IN MALE-FEMALE SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP, FULLER PARTICIPATION FOR WOMEN URGED

Aden 14 OCTOBER in Arabic 6 Nov 80 p 2

[Article by 'Umar 'Abd-al-'Aziz: "Problem of Relationship Between Man and Woman in Our Society"]

[Text] I do not want the first impression to be the impression that I am talking about complete issues concerning men and women in a manner that separates these issues and that contrasts man with woman in such a way as to lead to conflict and to a relationship of two fronts and two opposites. What I want to discuss is the historical particularity that has been formed as a result of numerous and complex factors and that has so distinguished between man and woman in our society that we can say that there is particularity and there is unity at the same time--a particularity gained as a result of the historical factors (both economic and intellectual) and a unity that is being bolstered with the transformations that are still in their early stages when compared to time and to the life of peoples. We have witnessed years of economic and social moves. But these moves are still dragging behind them many of the old legacies, sediments and psychology of man who is born and distinguished and in whose conscience and feelings survives a big part of the suspicious outlook toward women--an outlook embodied in a number of manifestations which we need not enumerate here because they are well-known and familiar. Just one reference is enough to indicate the miserable nature of this legacy. Guarding women and watching their every step has become the preoccupation of many of us. At home, we watch wife, sister and relative. At work, we watch the behavior of the female colleague. We thus live and impose on ourselves a complete course of observation and watch, even of females who are no relatives of ours, as if we were the guardians of "honor and virtue" while deep in our hearts we are fully prepared to commit acts in violation of this "honor and virtue."

With this hateful watching, we are wasting time and energies which could be beneficial if channelled toward that which truly enriches life.

This is a part of the social misery that is inevitably retreating because it is in conflict with the human essence of the relationship that should exist between man and woman.

## Return to Bilateral Worlds

We live in a single and interacting society and both man and woman live in a state of interaction in this society, whether at school, at work or at home. This relationship is growing stronger day by day. But this does not nullify the fact that the distinguishing features of the man's world are still present and the distinguishing features of the woman's world are still present. A man in our society lives a complete system of relations with work friends, (coffee shop) friends and drinking friends. He frequents soccer games, drinks a cup of tea at the coffee shop and goes with his friends to the sea. On the other hand, we find that the woman visits her female friends and goes to movies with them. But she is practically denied any participation with her husband, her brother or her father in a number of social and recreational activities. This doesn't deny, of course, that there has been tangible development in woman's participation in a number of social activities. But this participation is still limited in comparison to the visible presence of man in these activities, especially the activities of a public nature.

So far, the issue may seem ordinary. We may act passively and say that time is sure to take care of solving this problem and we may depend on the historical inevitabilities of social development. Under this passive outlook that denies the utmost importance of initiative and of intellectual action, we are experiencing a number of problems that find their expression in outrageous behavior and thought. For example, the wife knows only one aspect of her husband. He is the man who comes home, and lives there a certain number of hours for relaxation and the renewal of energy. But she doesn't know the other aspects of his personality at work and with his friends. The human being in us is not just one personality but a social complex whose interest and behavior change from one environment to another within the framework of his total fundamental personality.

The wife's ignorance of the many-sided composition of her husband's character and the husband's ignorance of the many-sided composition of his wife's character is likely to weaken the strong relationship between them and to make each seek his private pleasures with his friends and to live his distinctive world outside the home and at work. If we examine this issue carefully, we will find that the prevalent social relations are the culprit. This doesn't, of course, mean a call for justifying the disintegration of marital relations. This is a diagnosis of an evident fact with which we should not deal like ostriches which bury their heads in the sand when they sense danger.

To make the extremely negative aspect of this issue clearer, we beg to cite another manifestation!

## Selection

The relationship between man and woman starts with admiration and with affectionate words and feelings that frequently emanate from the romantic notions inspired by the historical privation each has experienced. He dreams of her and she dreams of him and they both reach for the immortal "happiness." Amidst family, friends and ululations of joy, they get married and a new page--surprisingly beautiful at the start--begins. But with time, new realities become clear. The factors that got

them together were as simple as the first smile and as translucent as the wedding gown, as well as dreamy and evanescent. There was no choice and selection built on firm and serene knowledge. The common bonds between them weaken day after day and the facts bare their fangs and exert their pressures while, on the other hand, the customs, traditions and [the fear of] shame also exert their pressures.

If the individual in our society gets to know and associate socially and humanly with the one he marries and if common experience and close and realistic relations bind the two, then a process of almost natural selection would take place and the results would be as close as possible to logic and reason.

This is not an illusion but a human hope and reality which we will realize eventually.

Thus, the difficulties start and the couple drown in the daily occurrence of their satisfaction and anger. He is at fault because he came home late and she is at fault because she doesn't understand his circumstances. They both get lost in these details and can no longer find the thread that controls this equation--that thread which goes back to the beginnings of the relationship and to [society's] failure to give them social means fundamentally and, consequently, the subjective means to have the time to test each other and to allow pre-marital association to strengthen the elements of agreement between them. The results can thus truly crown the relationship and will not be a sudden turning point in a relationship built on loose and weak foundations.

#### Economy Is One Key

Where does the solution to this problem that governs man's relationship with woman lie in particular?

The economic factor embodies in women's liberation and social participation is a factor with definite influence. But it is not the only factor. Women may participate in work and education. But parallel action on the intellectual and spiritual front is necessary because changing the production relations and the legal relations can be done more easily than changing the intellectual and spiritual life. As a flagrant example in this regard, we can cite the family law which is considered a significant gain for the Yemeni woman but which is skirted in the ceremonial marriages and marriages of interest that we witness daily.

Social awareness must develop. Rather, it must, if possible, surpass the social existence because we are suffering more from the past than from the present and more from the flighty mirages of the idealist thought than from our actual reality.

Therefore, economy is a fundamental and significant key to unlocking and dealing with this problem. But this key needs other keys that penetrate people's minds and consciences and that shake the old balance of the idols entrenched in the shrines of the old rituals--idols that dream and work for a "commendable" return to the "glorious" past.

## Arena Is Full

In the arena [life], we do not deal only with the officially adopted academic curricula and with what is written in papers, magazines and books. Rather, we deal with a deluge of cultural means and means of intellectual influence embodied in what we see on television and movies and what we hear from various radios.

Collectively, these means deal, among other things, with the issue of the relationship between man and woman from a certain angle. It is not mandatory that a predetermined position be taken toward these products. But the extent of their positive and negative impact must be observed so that the products may not undermine the efforts exerted on the intellectual and cultural front to mold a new man with a new mentality and with a realistic vision. This is a complex, significant and serious development front.

I say it is complex because its problems cannot be solved by law or decree but by the patient comprehension and understanding of these products, by sorting them and by selecting those among them that do not undermine our goals of educating man according to criteria that are far from unrealism. In this sense, we are required not to isolate ourselves on the one hand and, on the other hand, to keep up with these products, at least for the purpose of evaluating them and of understanding the political and ideological backgrounds that determine them. In other words, this means that these products should not be approached innocently and with goodwill. At the same time, we should not go to excesses in applying the criteria of ideological and political assessment. Above all, it is very necessary to have aesthetic generalizations which, in the final analysis, are philosophical generalizations that constitute a comprehensive attitude toward life. These generalizations which help us in the course of understanding the content of these works of art [previously referred to as products]--meaning the works that deal with the issues of man and woman--must be present because this presence will enhance the progressive course of the economic and legal understanding of women's role in society.

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CSO: 4802



DUBAI, OMAN APPROVE ACCORD ON TRADE RELATIONS

GP251140 Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 24 Dec 80 pp 1, 3

[Article by Latheef Farook]

[Text] The chambers of commerce and industry of Dubai and Oman have signed an agreement in Muscat to coordinate and promote industrial, trade and agricultural relations.

Presidents of the two chambers, Mr Saif Ahmad al-Ghurayr and Mr 'Ali Sultan, signed the agreement--the first of its kind.

Mr Ghurayr, who returned yesterday after an 8-day visit to Oman at the head of the Dubai delegation, said the agreement was a milestone in the direction of efforts of both sides to develop good relations for mutual benefit.

Among other things the agreement calls for closer coordination between the industrial and investment sectors of both sides, exchange of information with regard to markets, supply centers, prices, trademarks and licenses, and investment opportunities and incentives available to industrial sectors.

It also calls for:

- Accord on the basis on which location of industrial projects will be decided. In doing so the industrial policy and development plans of both sides will be taken into consideration, as well as the geographical, economic, raw material, labor and other factors determining the location.
- Coordination in marketing raw material for already established projects in both sides as well as marketing plans for new projects.
- Coordination of the trade activities in view of the continuous increase in the volume and value of foodstuff imported by the two sides.
- Encouragement for the exchange of information among the traders of the two sides on supply centers, value of products, conditions of sale and related matters.
- Coordination among the traders of the two sides with regard to the import of same items, so as to have a better bargaining position vis a vis suppliers.

- Uniformity in the specifications and standards for locally produced and imported goods.

Mr Ghurayr said that to begin with, joint ventures will be undertaken in the fields of industry, agriculture and poultry.

The two sides also formed a permanent joint committee to follow up the decisions taken during the visit, he added.

The Dubai side on the permanent committee is represented by Mr Ghurayr, Mr Juma al-Majid, Mr Sa'id an-Nabuda and Mr Sa'id al-Kindi, while the Oman side is represented by Mr 'Ali Sultan, Mr Khamir 'Ali Hassan, Mr Zuhayl Muhammad Bahiran and Mr Jamali.

Mr Ghurayr said the delegation toured various parts of the country, including some villages and areas in the interior, during its stay and noticed the development projects underway.

He said Oman was making a remarkable headway in the field of nation-building and all sectors were seen busy with development projects.

Mr Ghurayr said that during the visit the Dubai delegation was received by Sultan Qabus Ibn Sa'id of Oman, who welcomed the comprehensive cooperation between the two sides in various economic fields.

Sultan Qabus had said, "Oman now depends mainly on the private sector for its economic development.

"The country had tried to develop industries, agriculture and trade through the public sector but had failed due to the absence of personal incentives and initiative."

Great significance was attached to the visit of the Dubai delegation, which travelled in the special aircraft of his highness Shaykh Rashid Ibn Sa'id al-Maktum, vice president and prime minister of the UAE and ruler of Dubai.

Apart from Mr Ghurayr, the delegation included Mr Sa'id an-Nabuda, Mr Juma' al-Majid, Mr 'Isa al-Gurg, Mr Nasir 'Abd al-Lattif, Mr Sa'id al-Kindi, Mr Hassan Khanshib, Mr Jamal al-Ghurayr, and Mr Nizar Sardasht.

CSO: 4820

## BRIEFS

REAGAN'S MIDEAST POLICY--U.S. President-elect Ronald Reagan is trying to adopt a theory known as the "Jordanian solution." The President-elect, who has been campaigning for this theory, stated several times that Jordan is the key to the solution to the Middle East issue. The new U.S. President also stated that his first and main contacts will be with Jordan. These statements are meant to place political pressure on Jordan and the pressure will increase when President Reagan assumes power on 20 January. However, U.S. pressure will not influence Jordan, as witnessed by the statement made by King Husayn of Jordan in which he decisively and firmly supported the PLO and rejected the so-called "Jordanian solution." During the Carter administration, the United States tried to pressure King Husayn and to embroil Jordan in the Camp David talks. King Husayn resisted this extreme pressure, and Jordan managed to escape Camp David's trap despite the fact that Carter behaved violently and angrily toward Jordan. Carter's behavior was reflected in his envoys' attitude to the Middle East and was manifested in his statements and stands. Despite all this, Jordan refused to participate in the settlement brought about by Camp David, confirming that Jordan can resist Reagan's upcoming pressure as it resisted the previous pressure of the Carter administration. [Excerpt] [GF261950 Doha AR-RAYAH in Arabic 24 Dec 80 p 1]

CSO: 4820

## BRIEFS

PERMANENT CONSTITUTION STUDIES--Abu Dhabi, Dec 23 (AL WAHDAH)--The minister of state for Supreme Council Affairs, Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz Hamid al-Qasimi, has told AL-WAHDAH that the temporary constitution would not be renewed after the end of its mandate on December 2, 1981. He said that studies on a permanent constitution would begin very soon. He referred in this context to the contacts of the Federal National Council's Committee with the members of the Supreme Council. According to an official source in the ministry, efforts towards the preparation of the permanent constitution have begun. He hinted that the permanent constitution would be ready before December 2 next. The source added that a committee would be set up for this purpose. But informed sources said that such a committee to be set up by the Supreme Council will comprise some members of the Federal National Council. Hamad Bu Shihab, deputy chairman of the Federal National Council panel entrusted with drafting a reply to his highness President Shaykh Zayid's speech, told AL-WAHDAH that the panel would discuss at its meeting with the state president the issue of the permanent constitution. It will also propose the formation of committees for this purpose, he added. The final move in this regard rests with the Supreme Council, Hamad Bu Shihab added. [Text] [GF251150 Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 24 Dec 80 p 3]

CSO: 4820



## BRIEFS

**MILITARY SUCCESS AGAINST MOROCCO**--A new communique issued today by the SDAR Information Ministry said that the Saharan fighters on 23 December had a violent engagement with the Moroccan Royalist Forces in the area between al-Razmiyyah and Rouse al-'Ujj near the Moroccan-Saharan border. The communique explained that the invading royalist forces, after a 3-hour battle, left behind 36 killed and 3 GMC trucks. Four 106mm and 75 mm guns were destroyed. The communique added that a royalist convoy which tried to establish contact between Ra's El Khannfra and Abatih was forced to retreat by Saharan fighters who attacked the convoy. During its retreat the convoy passed through an area mined by the Saharan Liberation Army. This resulted in the destruction of one truck and two military vehicles carrying troops. These troops were all killed. [Text] [LD242132 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 24 Dec 80]

**CLASHES WITH MOROCCO**--A detailed communique was issued today by the SDAR about the battle of (Rous Lakhlayet) in the (Ras al-Qantarsh) region close to the Moroccan-Saharan border. The communique reveals that these battles, which occurred from 24 to 26 December, resulted in the death of 289 Moroccan soldiers and the injury of a similar number in addition to the downing of two aircraft, a Mirage and a Phantom, and the capture of the Phantom's pilot. The communique adds that the commander of the Third Moroccan Detachment, Major Rahmuni Allali, who was leading a force for the relief of the royal forces in these battles, was killed. In addition to these human losses, material losses of the invading forces amounted to 21 [words indistinct] vehicles, 21 GMC vehicles, 48 vehicles of various types, a large number of guns of various caliber, 2 tanks and a significant quantity of ammunition. [Excerpt] [LD291840 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 1300 GMT 29 Dec 80] One Moroccan Mirage-F1 and one F-5 aircraft were shot down yesterday at Rous Lakhlayet by the Saharan Popular Liberation Army. The pilot of the Moroccan F-5 was captured by the Saharan army. This great military feat, says a communique released by the Saharan Information Ministry, was realized on the occasion of the second anniversary commemoration of the death of the great combatant for the freedom and emancipation of oppressed peoples, the late President Houari Boumediene. This large-scale operation was launched on 24 December at Rous Lakhlayet in the region of Ras El Khannfra where the Saharan army had launched an offensive which turned into a real and fierce battle for positions, underlines the communique and adds that the battle continues. [Text] [LD281405 Algiers Domestic Service in French 1300 GMT 28 Dec 80]

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